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ARTICLE
TOO MANY TIARAS: CONFLICTING
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE FAMILY-OWNED
BUSINESS CONTEXT
*

Karen E. Boxx
ABSTRACT

Family-owned businesses have been called the “backbone of
the U.S. economy,” but passing control of a family business to the
next generation is so complex that the majority of family
businesses do not survive the transition. A common scenario that
leads to problems is where owners want to leave the business to
their children but only one child is interested in and capable of
managing the business. A popular solution is to leave the
interested child an equal share of the business, together with
management control, and leave the other children interests in
the business in trust, with the manager child as trustee. This
raises difficulties for the manager–trustee because the fiduciary
duties of a trustee are much stricter than those of a business
entity fiduciary. The children whose shares are in trust may also
be disadvantaged if the manager–trustee child is able to use the
lower business fiduciary standard to reduce the value of the
trusts’ interests in the business. The resulting uncertainty and
litigation increase the likelihood that the business will not
survive. This Article first reviews the specific duties owed by
trustees and by fiduciaries of the various business entity formats. It
then analyzes the theories supporting imposition of fiduciary duty
and the purposes of fiduciary duty in the various roles in order to
determine what level of duty is essential to the trustee–business

* Associate Professor, University of Washington School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Thomas R. Andrews and Todd Maybrown for invaluable assistance in
writing this article.
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fiduciary. Next it reviews case law where courts have had to
identify the applicable fiduciary duty for a dual-role fiduciary.
Finally, it argues for a new, hybrid duty that allows for the
flexibility to take on risk as needed in the business context and
that accommodates the fiduciary’s personal interests in the
business, but still recognizes the vulnerability of the trust
beneficiary. A clearer level of duty tailored to this unique position
would protect not only the business owners but all who benefit
from the continued viability of the family business.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION

The family situation of Harry Winston, the famed jeweler,
1
was similar to many closely held business owners. He had two

1.

Harry Winston, a child of Ukrainian immigrants, opened Harry Winston, Inc. in
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sons, one who graduated from Harvard with a degree in
chemistry, worked in rocket research, and then entered the
family business at the request of his father, and the other who
dropped out of college and, according to many accounts, was
uninterested in business affairs.2 When it came time to pass the
business down to his sons, Mr. Winston had the same instincts as
most parents in this situation: he wanted to treat his sons
equally financially but also wanted his business-oriented son in
charge of the company. He attempted to achieve this by leaving
the business equally to the sons, but Ronald, the hardworking
one, was a trustee, together with two professional trustees, for
the share of his brother, Bruce.3 Ronald was also left in charge of
4
running the business. The result of this estate plan was twelve
years of litigation between the brothers (and corresponding
litigation against the other trustees lasting even longer).5
The Winston estate illustrates the dilemma of both children
in this scenario. The uninvolved child is at the mercy of his
sibling, who has significant opportunity to exploit the position of
power while being protected by imprecise and, in some instances,
lax or nonexistent fiduciary standards of conduct. The child in
charge of the business, if the child wants to discharge her
fiduciary duties fairly, faces a more complex dilemma. That child
must act both as corporate fiduciary, running the business in the
best interests of all the stakeholders in the business, and as
trustee to her sibling, owing undivided loyalty to this one
shareholder.
Duties of a corporate fiduciary are much more lenient than
that of a trustee, and when a person is holding both roles, courts
are tempted to resolve the dilemma of judging the fiduciary’s
conduct by applying the stricter standard to the fiduciary’s

1932. Nina Burleigh, The Trouble with Harry Winston, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 18, 1999, at 46,
49, available at http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/bizfinance/biz/features/1028/. Harry
Winston, Inc. is known for being “the famous diamond dealer of choice for actresses in
need of Oscar adornments and for anyone rich enough to acquire a diamond tiara.”
Investors to Buy Major Stake of Harry Winston, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at B8. Winston
donated the Hope Diamond to the Smithsonian Institution, and the song, Diamonds Are a
Girl’s Best Friend, includes the line, “Talk to me Harry Winston.” Id.; JULE STYNE & LEO
ROBIN, Diamonds Are a Girl’s Best Friend, on GENTLEMEN PREFER BLONDES (Music Sales
Corp. 1949).
2. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 48–49; Joyce Wadler, Tranquility Elusive for Famed
Jeweler’s Heir, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at B2.
3. In re Winston, 833 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658−59 (App. Div. 2007); Burleigh, supra note
1, at 49.
4. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 49.
5. In re Winston, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 658−59; Investors to Buy Major Stake of Harry
Winston, supra note 1.
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conduct. However, there are economic reasons why a business
manager must be given more leeway in running the business
than a trustee is given in managing a trust. Holding the fiduciary
to the stricter standard is arguably less protection to the
beneficiary because the success of the business may be impaired.
Also to be considered are the intentions of the transferor who set
up this conflict. If the transferor’s intent was to allow maximum
flexibility to the fiduciary child, then that intent may be
thwarted by the higher standard. On the other hand, application
of the lower (and some have argued, now nonexistent) corporate
fiduciary duty ignores the absence of the balancing protections
available in most corporate settings that offset the fiduciary’s
relative freedom, such as the shareholder’s ability to sell the
investment and thus withdraw from the relationship if the
corporate fiduciary is abusing the freedom.6 The lesser standard
can therefore leave the uninvolved child with no protection from
exploitation by the business-manager sibling. The answer cannot
be as simple as choosing one standard over the other but rather
requires fashioning a distinct standard that both protects the
beneficiary and allows sufficient management autonomy to allow
the business to prosper.
This is not an easy task, in light of the current uncertainties
over the appropriate extent of fiduciary duties of both trustees
and business managers. The tenor of the debate in the trust
context is much more constrained than in the business fiduciary
context, in light of the long history of strict duty for trustees, but
in both arenas the general point at issue is the extent to which
fiduciary duties should be mandatory and fixed, or waivable like
contractual terms.7 In the business context, the statutory trend is
8
a significant reduction in mandatory fiduciary duties.
Family businesses, called the “backbone of the [U.S.]
9
economy,” regularly struggle with succession planning, and this
legal uncertainty can be a significant threat to such a business’s

6. Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 297, 320 (1999) (discussing the limitations of breach of fiduciary duty claims
and concluding that those limitations have rendered the cause of action “almost nonexistent”).
7. See infra Part II.E.
8. See Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41
TULSA L. REV. 451, 453–58 (2006) (discussing the shift from fiduciary duties to
contractualism in the uniform laws); see also Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The “New”
Fiduciary Standards Under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: More
Bottom Bumping from NCCUSL, 61 ME. L. REV. 27, 28 n.2, 29–30, 43 (2009).
9. E.g., Matthew Bandyk, How to Keep Drama Out of a Family Business, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 16, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/businesseconomy/small-business/articles/2008/05/16/how-to-keep-drama-out-of-a-family-business.
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survival.10 Analysis of the problem would not only be
advantageous to business succession planning but also can
advance the continuing scholarly debate regarding the evolution
of fiduciary duty in the trust and business entity contexts.
This Article will first summarize the evolution and current
formulation of duties of trustees and of various business
managers in the corporate, partnership, and limited liability
corporation models. It will next explore the theoretical
approaches to fiduciary duty, how those approaches have affected
the different roles of trust and corporate fiduciary, and how the
different theories affect potential future shifting of those duties.
The Article will then consider the justifications for the discrepancies
in the different roles in order to determine which level of duties is
appropriate for the dual-role fiduciary. The next section will visit
the Winston family saga and similar family-business struggles and
analyze the dual-role fiduciary and how courts have dealt with
the conflicting duties. The Article then proposes an approach to
defining the parameters of such a fiduciary’s unique duties.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS DEFINED BY A SPECIFIC ROLE
A. General Principles of Fiduciary Duty
While a unified definition of fiduciary has yet to be agreed
upon,11 the essence of a relationship found to be fiduciary is
open-ended control by one person over property owned by
another person or other discretionary power of one person over
another.12 The fiduciary has been entrusted with this power and
has been given some level of unsupervised discretion, so the label
of fiduciary, with its attending duties, is imposed to substitute for
the lack of supervision.13 Once the label of fiduciary attaches, the

10. See Charles D. Fox IV, Non-Tax Considerations in the Succession of Closely Held
Businesses, in 36 PHILIP E. HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 9-1, 9-2 to -3
(Tina Portuondo ed., 2002).
11. See P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITIES, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 1,
24 (T.G. Youdan ed., 1989) (“It is striking that a principle so long standing and so widely
accepted should be the subject of the uncertainty that now prevails.”); Robert W. Hillman,
Closely-Held Firms and the Common Law of Fiduciary Duty: What Explains the Enduring
Qualities of a Punctilio?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 441, 442 (2006) (“As law goes, fiduciary
doctrine is long on generalities and short on substance.”).
12. Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM.
U. L. REV. 75, 80, 110, 113 (2004).
13. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV . 1045, 1051–53 (1991)
(arguing that penalties for self-dealing that are steeper than usual contract damages
are necessary for deterrence because of the ease of hiding breaches of duty); D.
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
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person entrusted with the power is encumbered with the duty to
act unselfishly, and breaches of such duty are punished more
harshly than mere breaches of contract.14 The extent of the
15
unselfishness required depends on the specific relationship. The
more power the fiduciary has, and the less power and control the
beneficiary of the relationship has, the higher the duty.16 As
stated by Professor Scott:
The greater the independent authority to be exercised by
the fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty.
Thus, a trustee is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is an
agent upon whom limited authority is conferred or a
corporate director who can act only as a member of the
board of directors or a promoter acting for investors in a
17
new corporation.
The purpose of the fiduciary label is to prevent abuse of the
position.18 In economic terms, it can reduce agency costs, the costs of
separating ownership and management.19 Any time risk-bearing
(by the equity owners, such as trust beneficiaries or corporate
stockholders) is separated from managing the assets (delegated to
the trustee or corporate managers), the managers’ incentives to get
the highest return and otherwise protect the assets are weakened
because any profit (and any loss) goes to the risk-bearer.20 In order
to avoid loss due to the manager’s lack of self-interest in the
transactions, the risk-bearer must monitor the manager’s
actions, provide financial incentive, and be able to recover from

1399, 1482 (2002) (“[T]he purpose of fiduciary duty is to combat opportunism in such
relationships.”).
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRUSTS § 78 & cmt. a (2007); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425,
441 (1993) (stating that damages for breach of contract are usually limited to the
promisee’s loss, while damages for breach of fiduciary duty usually include all profits
obtained by the fiduciary due to the breach). In addition, if a trustee breaches her
duty of loyalty by self-dealing (i.e., transacting with the trust in her individual
capacity), then there is no further inquiry and the transaction is voidable by the
beneficiaries regardless of the fairness of the transaction. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT
& GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF T RUSTS AND T RUSTEES § 543, at 247−48 (2d
ed. rev. 1993).
15. Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Smith, supra note 13, at 1482.
19. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 623, 677−83 (2004).
20. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs,
38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277 (1986); see LEX DONALDSON, AMERICAN ANTI -MANAGEMENT
T HEORIES OF ORGANIZATION 165 (1995) (“Agency theory tends to see managers as ever
ready to cheat the principals or owners unless constantly controlled in some way.”).
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the manager for poor performance.21 These agency costs22—i.e.,
the costs of maintaining the agency relationship—are a
consideration whenever risk-bearing and management are
separated, and fiduciary duty (and potential liability for its
breach) is one means to keep the manager in check.23
Essentially, there are two fiduciary duties: the duty of care
24
and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care is the duty to perform
competently and includes the duty to carry out the fiduciary
purpose—to be prudent in one’s actions; to protect property
entrusted to the fiduciary in the fiduciary capacity; to earmark
such property and not to commingle with the fiduciary’s own
assets; to invest such property prudently, which may include a
duty to diversify; to account to the beneficiaries; and to be
impartial in the treatment of the persons who hold an interest in
the fiduciary property.25 The duty of loyalty is the duty of
unselfishness, the duty to refrain from exploiting the relationship
for personal gain and to refrain from taking any benefit from the
26
relationship other than reasonable compensation. Breaches of
the duty of care generally are punished less severely than
breaches of the duty of loyalty,27 but the strictness of each duty
28
varies significantly depending on the type of fiduciary role.
B. Fiduciary Duties of a Trustee
The trustee is the most vertical of the fiduciary relationships
because the beneficiary has virtually no control over the trustee’s
actions, restricted ability to monitor the trustee’s actions, and
restricted ability to exit the relationship by removing the assets

21. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 277−78, 291.
22. Michael Jensen and William Meckling, in their classic 1976 essay on agency
costs, defined agency costs as “(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the
bonding expenditures by the agent, (3) the residual loss.” Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (footnote omitted).
23. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 677−83 (contrasting the effect of fiduciary rules to
curb agency costs in trusts and corporations).
24. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625, 655 (1995) (“The law of fiduciary administration . . . resolves into two great
principles, the duties of loyalty and prudence.”).
25. 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER,
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS §§ 17.3−.15 (5th ed. 2007).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 & cmt. c(4) (2007); see Karen E. Boxx, Of
Punctilios and Paybacks: The Duty of Loyalty Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L.
REV. 279, 280−83, 300 (2002).
27. Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper
of Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 325 (1986).
28. Scott, supra note 15, at 541.
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from the trustee’s control.29 There is also no other monitoring
mechanism in place to protect the beneficiary, such as court
supervision in a guardianship or market forces affecting the price
30
of stock in a publicly held corporation. The trustee’s fiduciary
duties are therefore among the most stringent, setting the gold
standard for fiduciary unselfishness, and all other fiduciary
31
relationships descend from that standard.
So what is that gold standard? The duties of a trustee will
primarily be defined by the terms of the individual trust
32
instrument. However, state statutes and the common law
provide both default rules, which apply in the absence of
provisions of the trust instrument, and mandatory rules, which
apply regardless of the provisions of the trust instrument.33
A trustee’s duty of loyalty under common law prohibits
self-dealing, except when the settlor of the trust authorized the
transaction or all of the beneficiaries consented after full
34
disclosure. Self-dealing includes not only transactions between
the trust and the trustee in her individual capacity, but also
transactions between the trust and an alter ego of the trustee,
such as a straw man, close relative, or an entity substantially
owned by the trustee.35 Whether the relationship between the
trustee and third party to the transaction is close enough to trigger
36
self-dealing rules is usually a question of fact. Self-dealing is
generally prohibited even if the price is set by a third party.37
If a trustee engages in self-dealing, then the transaction is
voidable at the option of the beneficiary, regardless of whether

29. See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 775−77 (2000) (describing the vertical nature of the trustee–beneficiary
relationship); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 437 (comparing fiduciary
standards of trustees, partners, and managers).
30. See Smith, supra note 13, at 1429 & n.131, 1454; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 570–71 (2003) (stating
that fiduciary obligation is the beneficiaries’ principal recourse, due to the limits on trust
beneficiaries’ control).
31. See Smith, supra note 13, at 1452−54 (describing trusts as “quintessential
fiduciary relationships” and quoting the Restatement for the proposition that the “duties
of a trustee are more [rigorous] than those of most other fiduciaries” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 16.1, at 1022; see also John H.
Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1121−22 (2004).
33. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428−29 (2006); 3 SCOTT,
FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 16.1, at 1022−23; Langbein, supra note 32, at 1105,
1112.
34. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170(1) cmt. t, 216(1), (2)(b) (1959).
35. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, §§ 17.2.1.3 to .4, at 1095−1102.
36. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 14, § 543(A), at 281−82.
37. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.1.2, at 1091.
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the transaction was otherwise fair to the trust.38 The beneficiaries
have a broad range of remedies, including requiring the trustee to
pay over to the trust any profit made by the trustee, requiring the
trustee to return the property to the trust, or requiring the trustee
to pay into the trust the difference between the fair market value
and the price paid by the trustee.39 The beneficiaries can also elect
to confirm the sale if the property’s value drops below what the
trustee paid.40 Fairness of the transaction to the trust is not a
defense; the mere fact of self-dealing triggers the beneficiaries’
41
remedies. This “no further inquiry” rule is justified on the principle
that it is a breach of the trustee’s duty merely to put himself in a
conflict of interest with the trust; taking unfair advantage of the
42
conflict is not a necessary element of the breach. According to
Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman’s economic rationale for the
no further inquiry rule,43 the potential for unfair profit for the selfdealing trustee is too great, and the likelihood of getting caught is
too small (because of the obstacles to supervising the trustee), so the
more common contractual remedy of disgorging only the difference
between a fair sale and the actual sales price would not be a
sufficient deterrent to bad behavior.44 The stiffer penalties of the no
further inquiry rule are therefore necessary to compensate for the
inadequate supervision.
45
Self-dealing may be authorized by the trust instrument, but
the trust instrument cannot relieve the trustee of the duty to act
in good faith and in furtherance of the trust purposes.46
38. Id. § 17.2, at 1078−80; see Fulton Nat’l Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 571 (5th Cir.
1966) (“[T]he beneficiary need only show that the fiduciary allowed himself to be placed in a
position where his personal interest might conflict with the interest of the beneficiary. It is
unnecessary to show that the fiduciary succumbed to this temptation, that he acted in bad
faith, that he gained an advantage, fair or unfair, that the beneficiary was harmed. Indeed, the
law presumes that the fiduciary acted disloyally, and inquiry into such matters is foreclosed.”).
39. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.1.1, at 1089−90.
40. Id. at 1090−91.
41. 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 170.1, at 316 (4th ed. 1987) (“It is now, of course, well settled in the United
States as well as in England that a sale by a trustee to himself individually can be set
aside if it was made without the consent of the beneficiaries, even though it was made in
good faith and for a fair consideration.”).
42. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.1, at 1087; see also BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 14, § 543, at 228 (“[E]quity deems it better to . . . strike down all
disloyal acts, rather than to attempt to separate the harmless and the harmful by
permitting the trustee to justify his representation of two interests.”); Sitkoff, supra note
30, at 573−74.
43. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 1051–54, 1074.
44. Id.
45. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.11, at 1138–39.
46. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428−29 (2006); 1
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt. t (1959) (“By the terms of the trust the
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A trustee’s duty of care is similarly construed very strictly.
The duty was originally phrased as the duty to exercise such care
as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with
his or her own property with an eye towards long-term
47
preservation of the estate. The prudent person rule has been
updated to the “prudent investor” rule, clarifying that the
trustee’s decisions should be based on the purposes and
circumstances of the trust and its beneficiaries.48 The hallmark of
the trustee’s duty of care is minimizing risk: “[T]he trustee must
accept only that level of overall risk that is appropriate, in light
of all the circumstances, for the trust and its beneficiaries.”49 The
trustee’s duty of care has even been phrased as a duty of
50
caution. As stated in the comments to the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act, “A trust whose main purpose is to support an
elderly widow of modest means will have a lower risk tolerance
51
than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great wealth.”
The duty of care includes the duty to delegate responsibly,
which originally was the duty not to delegate but which by
necessity evolved to permission to delegate as long as the trustee
used “reasonable care, skill, and caution” in selecting the agent
52
and in monitoring the agent’s actions. The reason for this
evolution was the increasing complexity of financial markets and
investment decisions, making it necessary for lay trustees to rely
53
on advisors. The trustee’s duty of care also includes the duty to
preserve trust property, which includes the duty to exercise
reasonable care to keep the property in good repair,54 the duty to

trustee may be permitted to sell trust property to himself individually, or as trustee to
purchase property from himself individually, or to lend to himself money held by him in
trust, or otherwise to deal with the trust property on his own account. The trustee violates
his duty to the beneficiary, however, if he acts in bad faith, no matter how broad may be the
provisions of the terms of the trust in conferring power upon him to deal with the trust
property on his own account.”); 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 41, § 170.9, at 346.
47. 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 41, § 174, at 466−68.
48. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 & cmt., 7B U.L.A. 20−21 (2006).
49. 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 19.1.5, at 1399.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(2) (2007) (“The duty of prudence requires
the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution.”); 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra
note 25, § 19.1.5, at 1399 (“A trustee must act with reasonable caution.”).
51. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 21 (2006).
52. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(a) & cmt., 7B U.L.A. 39−40 (2006);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 cmt. d(2) (2007).
53. See 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.3, at 1174 (“[A] trustee
may now be under a duty to delegate that which the trustee cannot prudently undertake
personally.”); John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of
Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 650−52 (1996).
54. 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.8, at 1215−16.
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keep and render accounts,55 the duty not to commingle trust
assets with the trustee’s personal assets,56 the duty to earmark
trust assets as belonging to the trust,57 and the duty to make the
58
trust property productive. The duty to keep trust assets
separate and earmarked was traditionally read strictly; if there
was any loss of value of unearmarked or commingled assets, the
trustee was liable for the loss even if the failure to earmark or
keep separate was not the cause of the loss.59 For example, the
trustee who failed to earmark would be liable for a loss due to
general decline in the stock market. The more modern approach
is to hold the trustee liable for breach of these duties only if the
loss was caused by the breach.60
The trustee has a general duty to diversify trust investments
in order to minimize risks.61 The trust instrument can relieve the
trustee of the duty to diversify, but the trustee is still required to
exercise prudence and caution62 and may still be liable for failing
to diversify if circumstances indicate that diversification is
63
nevertheless necessary to protect trust assets.
The duty of care can generally be relaxed by the trust
instrument, but cannot eliminate “the fundamental requirement
that trustees not behave recklessly but act in good faith, with
some suitable degree of care, and in a manner consistent with the
terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the
64
beneficiaries.” An exculpatory clause in the trust instrument
will be strictly construed and will not be enforced to relieve a
65
trustee of liability for gross negligence or deliberate behavior.

55. Id. § 17.4, at 1186–88.
56. Id. § 17.11.1, at 1228.
57. Id. § 17.11.3, at 1233.
58. Id. § 17.13, at 1248 (“Ordinarily, a trustee has a duty to use reasonable care and
skill to make the trust property productive in a manner that is consistent with the
fiduciary duties of caution and impartiality.”).
59. Id. § 17.11.1, at 1230, § 17.11.3, at 1235.
60. Id.
61. 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 19.2, at 1427; see also Langbein,
supra note 53, at 646−48.
62. 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 19.3.2, at 1444–45.
63. See, e.g., Robertson v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 47 F.3d 1268, 1279 (3d
Cir. 1995); First Ala. Bank of Huntsville, N.A. v. Spragins, 475 So. 2d 512, 516 (Ala.
1985); In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332, 337 (N.Y. 1997); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 91 cmt. f (2007) (discussing that while diversification instructions are
typically permissive, as opposed to mandatory, such permissiveness does “not abrogate
the trustee’s duty to act prudently . . . because diversification is fundamental to prudent
risk management”).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 cmt. d (2007).
65. 4 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 24.27.2, at 1804.
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C. Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers
In the corporate setting, the board of directors and the
corporate officers are fiduciaries for the corporation and its
shareholders and traditionally have been bound by the same
general notions of a duty of care and a duty of loyalty as
trustees.66 The fiduciary duties imposed can and should be less
strict than that of a trustee, for several reasons. First, the
shareholder is theoretically in a better position to protect his
interests than a trust beneficiary because of ease of exit from
the relationship, better monitoring, and general controls of the
67
market. Also, in the business setting some risk is a necessary
element, as opposed to the conservative goals of the trust, and
self-dealing by business managers can benefit the business.68
Fiduciary duties of corporate managers are currently defined
much more narrowly and are further weakened by exceptions
and presumptions in favor of finding no breach of duty.69 In
addition, state statutes are moving in the direction of diluting
the duty of loyalty and allowing fiduciary duties to be virtually
eliminated by contract with the shareholders.70
The duty of care is particularly weakened in the corporate
setting. A typical statement of the duty of care is:
[A] duty to the corporation to perform the director’s or
officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the

66. See 1 STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 1–2 (6th ed. 2009)
(describing the duty of loyalty for directors as the duty to “maintain . . . the corporation’s
and its shareholders’ best interests over anyone else’s” and the duty of care as an
“obligation to act on an informed basis” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. See Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 570–73 (comparing interests of shareholders and
trust beneficiaries). But see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 355 (1932) (commenting that passive investors in
corporations largely surrender “the right that the corporation should be operated in their
sole interest” and the protection provided by the community for strict property rights).
68. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 437 (giving reasons for variations
in fiduciary duties of different relationships).
69. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate
Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV.
111, 142–45 (1993) (observing, in RUPA, the shift from a duty of good faith for corporate
partners to a lesser “obligation,” the allowance for parties to waive obligations for any
conduct that is not “manifestly unreasonable,” and the reduced burden of proof when
partners act in self-interest (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a history of the
evolution of fiduciary duty in the corporate context, see id. at 123–40.
70. See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text; see also Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1791 (2001) (“The net result is that, as a practical matter, a
negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after leaving her board meeting
than she is to pay damages.”).
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corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like
71
position and under similar circumstances.

The Model Business Corporation Act, aiming to avoid the
tort law implications of prudent person language,72 phrases the
standard as the care that “a person in a like position would
reasonably believe appropriate.”73 The dilution of the duty
therefore begins with the basic definition, which is more
relaxed than the trustee’s corresponding duty to exercise care
that a prudent person would exercise in handling his or her
own affairs or in light of the circumstances of the trust
74
beneficiaries.
The duty of care in the corporate setting is even further
75
softened by the business judgment rule. The business
judgment rule creates a presumption that must be rebutted by
a party claiming a violation of the duty of care.76 Under the
business judgment rule, it is presumed “that in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
77
action taken was in the best interests of the company.” The
purpose of the business judgment rule is to allow corporate
managers sufficient discretion to manage the business
enterprise while still acknowledging the underlying duty of
care.78 The rule prevents a court from reviewing the
substantive merits of a particular board decision as long as the
procedure in making the decision complied with the
requirements of the business judgment rule.79 As a result of the

71. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (1992).
72. See R. Franklin Balotti & Joseph Hinsey IV, Director Care, Conduct, and Liability:
The Model Business Corporation Act Solution, 56 BUS. LAW. 35, 41, 50 (2000).
73. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2010).
74. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
75. The business judgment rule has a long history and has generated voluminous
scholarly analysis. The complexities of the rule are beyond the scope of this Article. For a
thorough analysis, see 1 RADIN, supra note 66, at 26–28.
76. Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L.
787, 791 (1999).
77. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
78. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (“The business judgment rule exists to protect and
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to . . . directors.” (citing
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981))); see also United Copper Sec. Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263–64 (1917) (“Courts interfere seldom to control
such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of misconduct
equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an
unprejudiced exercise of judgment . . . .”).
79. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
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business judgment rule, director negligence would have to be
gross rather than ordinary negligence to result in any
liability.80
In addition to the relaxed standard of care and the
presumption that due care was taken in all decisionmaking,
directors may also be protected from liability for duty of care
violations if the corporation has chosen to adopt a charter
provision limiting director liability.81 Under most state statutes, a
corporation may provide in its articles of incorporation that
directors shall not be liable for fiduciary violations, with certain
specific exceptions, such as violations of the duty of loyalty,
actions made in bad faith, and fiduciary violations that are
unlawful.82
So-called “exoneration provisions” were first authorized by
83
statute in Delaware. The Delaware legislature was concerned
about the holding in Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the Supreme
Court of Delaware held directors liable for not exercising due
care in approving a merger transaction.84 Van Gorkom was seen
as a judicial stretching of director liability, leaving existing and
potential directors of Delaware corporations feeling very
vulnerable.85 Adding to the director liability crisis was the
increasing cost and, in some cases, unavailability of director and
86
officer insurance. The legislature swiftly enacted a new
provision to its corporate code, which allows corporations to
include in the articles of incorporation
80. Carter G. Bishop, A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business
Organization Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 477, 483 (2006).
81. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1210 (1988).
82. See id. at 1210–12; see also Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom:
Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing
Officer Protection, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 313 & nn.48–49 (2006) (discussing and listing
the charter-option statutes of forty-four states).
83. 65 Del. Laws 544 (1986) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2011)); see E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional
Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 1, 10–11 (2003).
84. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873, 893 (Del. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
85. See Florence Shu-Acquaye, Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in
Light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2004 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 19, 36 (discussing
directors’ “heightened vulnerability to liability for breach of the fiduciary duty of care” in
the wake of Van Gorkom); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of
Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 793–94 (1994).
86. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 415 (2005); see Deborah
Cahalane, Comment, 1986 Ohio Corporation Amendments: Expanding the Scope of
Director Immunity, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 671 (1987).
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[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided
that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of
a director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to
the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions
not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title
[(unlawful payment of dividends and unlawful stock
redemption)]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
87
director derived an improper personal benefit.

All of the other states quickly followed Delaware’s lead and
enacted similar exoneration statutes,88 and many have enacted
other provisions expanding the corporation’s authority to indemnify
directors and officers against liability,89 capping damages,90 and in
some instances limiting liability for all directors to willful
misconduct or recklessness, without requiring the corporation to
elect into limited liability in the charter.91 The current state of the
duty of care is that of a tepid constraint on director behavior. One
commentator remarked that the corporate director’s duty of care “is
spoken of in unusually shrunken terms.”92
The duty of loyalty is also much less strict in the corporate
setting. Unlike the trustee, who is forbidden from self-dealing and is
subject to the no further inquiry rule, which makes fairness of the
93
transaction irrelevant, a director engaging in self-dealing has
almost always been allowed to avoid liability by showing procedural
and substantive fairness of the transaction.94 Substantive fairness
has even been dropped as a requirement in most state statutes,
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (2011).
88. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the
Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 331–32 & n.93 (2004); Hanks,
supra note 81, at 1209.
89. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-851 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS’NS § 2-418 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011); see also Hanks, supra note 81, at 1221.
90. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2011).
91. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0831(1)–(2) (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)
(LexisNexis 2010). Some states with automatic limitation of liability allow the corporation
to opt out of the limitation in the charter. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.345, .355 (West
Supp. 2011).
92. Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 28 (2003). It should also be noted that although Sarbanes-Oxley imposes
significant duties of oversight on corporate directors, it imposes no corresponding liability for
breach of those duties, even though corporate officers incur personal liability for breaching the
statute. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, §§ 302, 307, 906, 116 Stat.
745, 777, 784, 806 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7245 (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
93. See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text.
94. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors
and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 58–59 (2006–2007).
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which allow a director to engage in self-dealing with the corporation
if the transaction is approved by a majority of disinterested
directors or shareholders, or even if not so approved, if a court finds
that the transaction was fair to the corporation.95
State statutes generally do not state an affirmative duty of
loyalty for corporate managers but many do prohibit certain
96
breaches of that duty. Nevertheless, the duty of loyalty, even in
the more liberal corporate environment and with the recent trend
of confining duties, is not limited to a checklist of violations. As
Justice Cardozo stated, “Equity refuses to confine within the
bounds of classified transactions its precept of a loyalty that is
97
undivided and unselfish.”
The Delaware courts have added another aspect of the duty
98
of loyalty: the duty to act in good faith. In the much-discussed
Disney litigation involving the hiring and firing of Michael
Ovitz, the court of chancery initially labeled good faith as a
99
third fiduciary duty. Although the court acknowledged that
previous Delaware decisions were unclear as to whether a
separate duty existed, calling it a “fog of . . . hazy
jurisprudence,” the court concluded that “the concept of
intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s
responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only)
standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in
good faith.”100 Shortly after the Disney court of chancery
opinion was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, the
supreme court further clarified the role of good faith in Stone
v. Ritter.101 The Stone court called good faith a “‘subsidiary
element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of
102
loyalty.’”

95. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011); Stegemeier v. Magness, 728
A.2d 557, 562 (Del. 1999); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 365 (Del.
1993), modified on other grounds, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.61(b) (2010); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 5.1 (1986) (reviewing the
evolution of voidability of interested director transactions); 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER
& DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 4.05, at 4-13
(7th ed. 2006); Brown, supra note 94, at 60.
96. See Hanks, supra note 81, at 1211–12.
97. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928).
98. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(identifying a “good faith require[ment] of a corporate fiduciary” that is distinct from the
duties of care and loyalty), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
99. Id. at 697, 745.
100. Id. at 753–55.
101. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
102. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34
(Del. Ch. 2003)); see also Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law,
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D. Fiduciary Duties of Managers and Owners of Unincorporated
Entities
The various forms of unincorporated entities, such as family
limited partnerships and limited liability companies, are
extremely important when considering the ramifications of
holding dual fiduciary positions because of the increasing
popularity of these entity forms in estate planning and family
business planning.103
1. General Partnerships. The evolution of fiduciary duties
104
in this context began with the general partnership. In a classic
partnership, the balance of power among participants is much
closer to the horizontal contract model and farther from the
vertical trust model because all parties have power over the
organization and each other.105 Therefore, because the parties
serve as fiduciaries to each other, and because each fiduciary also
holds a beneficial interest in the enterprise (aligning the
fiduciary’s interest with the beneficiary’s), the fiduciary duties
will be less strict than those imposed on a trustee.106 However,
despite the fact that each partner is subject to personal liability
for actions of the other partners, a partner’s fiduciary duty was
traditionally considered stricter than that of a corporate director
107
or officer.
It was in a case involving a partnership that Judge Cardozo
made his classic statement of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which

43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 470 (2009).
103. See JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE
PLANNING § 11.1, at 11-4 (2010 ed.) (“Most commonly, the family entity takes the form of
a so-called ‘family limited partnership’ (FLP), but they can be (and many times are) in the
form of any limited liability entity, including the LLC and the S corporation.”); Kenneth
P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby, III, Family Limited Partnerships: Decanting Family
Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 128 (1995).
104. See Brier & Darby, supra note 103, at 140 (explaining that the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act defined limited partnerships through reference to general partnerships).
105. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 432–33.
106. See id. at 432–34 (listing various fiduciary relationships and the variations in
their duties). A similar relationship, when courts have taken an even more relaxed view of
the parties’ fiduciary duties, is the duty owed by spouses in community property states in
dealing with the community property. See Lisa R. Mahle, A Purse of Her Own: The Case
Against Joint Bank Accounts, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 45, 54 (2006) (stating that California
is “the only state to have given robust legal content to the business partnership analogy”
to the spousal relationship); see also Alexandria Streich, Comment, Spousal Fiduciaries in
the Marital Partnership: Marriage Means Business but the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of
Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 367, 379 (1998).
107. See Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution
Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability
Company?, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 448 (2001).
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continues to be cited regularly by the courts in all categories of
fiduciary cases.108 In Meinhard v. Salmon, two partners leased a
building and subleased to shops and offices.109 Before termination
of the lease, the partner managing the enterprise entered into a
new lease with the property owner that did not include the other
partner.110 In condemning this misappropriation of the venture’s
business opportunity, Judge Cardozo stated:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one
another . . . the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting
at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition
that
is
unbending
and
inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of
particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
111
trodden by the crowd.
The common law therefore initially viewed fiduciary
duties of participants in unincorporated entities as an
essential part of the relationship. The Uniform Partnership
112
Act (UPA), applicable to general partnerships,
was
introduced in 1914 and did not specifically define the scope of
fiduciary duties of partners.113 Instead, it incorporated the law
114
and specified only that a partner was
of agency
“[a]ccountable as a [f]iduciary” and “must account to the
partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any
profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with . . . the

108. See Hillman, supra note 11, at 443 (acknowledging Justice Cardozo’s standard
as “the controlling precedent in fiduciary duty litigation”).
109. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 545–46 (N.Y. 1928).
110. Id. at 546.
111. Id. (citation omitted).
112. “General partnership” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as: “A partnership in
which all partners participate fully in running the business and share equally in profits
and losses (though the partners’ monetary contributions may vary).” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1230 (9th ed. 2009).
113. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. (2001); J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract,
Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 448 (1997).
114. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 4(3), 6 U.L.A. 386 (2001).
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partnership.”115 The UPA was not revised until 1992, and the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), in response to
concerns about “galloping Meinhardism,”116 took a very different
approach to defining a partner’s fiduciary duty. Section 404
limits a partner’s duty of loyalty to: a duty “to account to the
partnership and hold as trustee for it any property” acquired
personally by the partner in connection with the partnership’s
business; a prohibition on dealing with the partnership “as or on
behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership”;
and a prohibition against competing with the partnership.117
RUPA further narrows the duty of loyalty by allowing for
some self-dealing:
A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under
this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely
because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own
interest.
A partner may lend money to and transact other
business with the partnership, and as to each loan or
transaction the rights and obligations of the partner are the
same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to
118
other applicable law.
The second aspect of a partner’s duty of loyalty—dealing
with the partnership as someone with an adverse interest—is
therefore not the broad prohibition on self-dealing that it might
appear to be, since loaning money or otherwise transacting
business with the partnership would arguably give the partner
an interest adverse to the partnership. The RUPA comments
make clear that in this area, a partner is not like a trustee:
A partner as such is not a trustee and is not held to the
same standards as a trustee. Subsection (e) makes clear
that a partner’s conduct is not deemed to be improper
merely because it serves the partner’s own individual
interest.
That admonition has particular application to the duty of
loyalty and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. It
115. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 194 (2001). That language was read by the courts
not to limit a partner’s fiduciary responsibilities to that specified duty, but rather was read as
confirmation of a broad duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 545–46; Dickerson,
supra note 69, at 114.
116. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with
the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1627–28 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001).
118. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e)–(f) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001) (alteration in
original).
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underscores the partner’s rights as an owner and principal in
the enterprise, which must always be balanced against his
duties and obligations as an agent and fiduciary. For example,
a partner who, with consent, owns a shopping center may,
under subsection (e), legitimately vote against a proposal by
119
the partnership to open a competing shopping center.

The RUPA drafters therefore made specific accommodation
to the fiduciary responsibility in light of the unavoidable conflict
of being both fiduciary and joint owner. With respect to duty of
care, RUPA states that a partner’s duty is “limited to refraining
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct,
120
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”
Therefore, ordinary negligence of a partner will not expose her to
liability, unless the partnership agreement creates a higher duty
121
of care than the statute. The gross negligence standard for
partners has been likened to the standard applied to corporate
directors, which is ordinary negligence but lessened considerably
122
by the business judgment rule.
In addition to the stated duties of loyalty and care, RUPA
requires that a partner’s actions with respect to the partnership
shall be consistent “with the obligation of good faith and fair
123
dealing.” The requirement of good faith is arguably not a
fiduciary duty but rather the baseline duty owed in all
contractual relationships.124
As to waiver, RUPA provides that the duty of loyalty cannot be
entirely eliminated by the partnership agreement, but that the
agreement “may identify specific types or categories of activities
that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly
125
unreasonable,” and that all the partners, or a lesser number

119.
120.
121.
122.

UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 5 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 146 (2001).
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73, 143 (2001).
See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103, 404(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001).
PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 402 cmt. (1992), reprinted in 3 LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES app. c, at c-45 (2011).
123. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(d) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); Dibadj, supra note 8, at
461. Whether this duty of good faith is higher than the contractual duty of good faith and
whether good faith is a third, separate fiduciary duty is a matter of some controversy. See
Dickerson, supra note 69, at 133–36. The RUPA comments, however, specify that the duty
of good faith imposed by Section 404 is the contractual duty: “The obligation of good faith
and fair dealing is a contract concept, imposed on the partners because of the consensual
nature of a partnership. It is not characterized, in RUPA, as a fiduciary duty arising out
of the partners’ special relationship.” UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 (amended 1997), 6
U.L.A. 145 (2001) (citation omitted).
125. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).
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specified in the agreement, may authorize or ratify a specific act or
transaction that would be a violation of the duty of loyalty, after full
disclosure of all material facts.126 The duty to act in good faith
cannot be waived, but the partnership agreement “may prescribe
the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be
measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.”127
2. Limited Partnerships. General partnerships have the
128
disadvantage of exposing all partners to personal liability, so
other forms of unincorporated entities were devised that retained
the pass-through taxation of a partnership but allowed for
limited liability similar to corporations.129 The first of these was
130
the limited partnership. A limited partnership requires at least
one general partner, who has personal liability, and at least one
limited partner, whose liability is limited to his or her
131
investment in the partnership.
The first Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) was
132
promulgated in 1916 and revised in 1976. In 1985, the Act was
substantially amended, and that new version was known as the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA).133 The Uniform
Act was again amended in 2001, and that revision is commonly
referred to as Re-RULPA.134 The most significant aspect of ReRULPA was delinking the Limited Partnership Act from RUPA and
135
creating a new stand-alone act. Limited partners owe no fiduciary
duties to other partners or to the partnership, according to the Act,
126. Id. Note that the ability of the partners to ratify or authorize in advance certain
transactions is consistent with trust beneficiaries’ ability to do the same. See UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 1009 (amended 2001), 7C U.L.A. 656 (2006).
127. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(5) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).
128. WILLIAM GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 206, at 334 (3d ed.
2001).
129. Carter G. Bishop, Unincorporated Limited Liability Business Organizations:
Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985, 989–91, 997,
1004 (1995).
130. Id. at 989. For an overview of the limited partnership and the other
unincorporated business entities discussed in this section, see id. at 993–1004. See
also L ARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW , U NINCORPORATED BUSINESS
ENTITIES § 11.01 (4th ed. 2009), for additional background and history of the limited
partnership.
131. William P. Streng, Choice of Entity, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 700-3d, at A-11
(2007).
132. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT prefatory note (amended 1985), 6B U.L.A. 4 (2008).
133. Id.; Thomas E. Geu & Barry B. Nekritz, Expectations for the Twenty-First
Century: An Overview of the New Limited Partnership Act, PROB. & PROP., Jan.–Feb. 2002,
at 47, 47 (2002).
134. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (amended 2001), 6A U.L.A. (2008); Geu & Nekritz, supra
note 133, at 47.
135. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT prefatory note (2001).
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and are free to further their own interests.136 Although Re-RULPA
now contains its own statement of the general partners’ duties, it
borrows the RUPA provisions almost word for word.137 The only
difference between Re-RULPA’s section on fiduciary duties of
general partners and RUPA’s section on partners’ fiduciary duties is
the omission in Re-RULPA of the specific authorization for a
partner to “lend money to and transact other business with the
partnership.”138 RUPA therefore has a more permissive attitude
towards self-dealing, which may be because of the difference in
power in a limited partnership. The fiduciary standard should be
higher in a limited partnership because the general partner has
independent authority and the limited partner lacks management
139
power, thus coming closer to a trustee–beneficiary relationship.
Re-RULPA also incorporates, word for word, RUPA’s gross
140
negligence standard for a general partner’s duty of care.
3. Limited Liability Companies. Surpassing the limited
partnership in current popularity is the limited liability company
141
(LLC). The LLC’s attractiveness lies in its combination of the
136. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 305 (amended 2001), 6A U.L.A. 424 (2008).
137. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 583, 607–08 (2004).
138. Compare UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(f) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001)
(permitting partners to “lend money to and transact other business with the
partnership”), with UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408 (amended 2001), 6A U.L.A. 439–40 (2008)
(lacking the explicit authorization found in RUPA).
139. GREGORY, supra note 128, § 264, at 438. Re-RULPA assumed that limited
partnerships currently would be used in settings where the limited partners had virtually
no management power:
This Act therefore targets two types of enterprises that seem largely beyond the
scope of LLPs and LLCs: (i) sophisticated, manager-entrenched commercial deals
whose participants commit for the long term, and (ii) estate planning
arrangements (family limited partnerships). This Act accordingly assumes that,
more often than not, people utilizing it will want:
• strong centralized management, strongly entrenched, and
• passive investors with little control over or right to exit the entity[.]
The Act’s rules, and particularly its default rules, have been designed to reflect
these assumptions.
UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT prefatory note (2001).
140. Compare UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408(c) (amended 2001), 6A U.L.A. 439 (2008)
(“A general partner’s duty of care to the limited partnership . . . is limited to refraining
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a
knowing violation of law.”), with UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143
(2001) (“A partner’s duty of care to the partnership . . . is limited to refraining from
engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing
violation of law.”).
141. See PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 103, § 11.1.1, at 11-5 (“Propelled by tax and
nontax considerations and considerable hype, the LLC has become the vehicle of choice.”);
David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should
Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility
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best features of two entities: it offers pass-through taxation, like
a partnership, and limited liability for all participants, like a
corporation.142 The Uniform Law Commissioners responded to the
surge of interest in LLCs in 1996 with the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, which was revised in 2006.143 Because the
LLC is somewhat of a hybrid of a corporation and a
144
partnership, the fiduciary duties owed by owners–managers
could draw from either the corporate or partnership model,145 and
the Act chose to straddle the forms in at least one respect.
Fiduciary duties under the Act depend on whether the company
is managed by all members (a “member-managed limited liability
company”) or is managed by a group of managers elected by
146
members (a “manager-managed limited liability company”). In
a manager-managed company, members who are not managers
(like shareholders in a public corporation) owe no fiduciary duty
147
to the other members or the company. Under the original Act,
managers of a manager-managed company and all members of a
member-managed company were held to exactly the same duties
148
as a partner under RUPA. The 2006 revisions changed the
and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 447
& n.108 (1998) (“The LLC has spread like wildfire throughout the country.”); Howard M.
Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution—The Social Cost of Academic Neglect, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 35 (2004) (“The Limited Liability Company (‘LLC’) has become the
dominant form for newly-created small businesses in a clear majority of the states . . . .
Nationwide, over 45% of new businesses are LLCs.”); Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction
for LLC Research in a Contractarian Legal Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 351, 358–64
(2003) (summarizing the evolution of the LLC); see also UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT prefatory
note (2001) (“The new Act has been drafted for a world in which limited liability
partnerships and limited liability companies can meet many of the needs formerly met by
limited partnerships.”).
142. Elliot Manning, Partnerships—Conceptual Overview, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 710
T.M., at A-61 (2010); Streng, supra note 131, at A-13.
143. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, 6B U.L.A. (2008).
144. Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 417, 422–23, 428 (1995).
145. See Cohen, supra note 141, at 461.
146. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 102(10), (12) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 429 (2008).
147. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(g)(5) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 489 (2008) (“A
member does not have any fiduciary duty to the company or to any other member solely
by reason of being a member.”). This release from duty is also identical to that granted
limited partners under ULPA 2001. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 305(a) (amended 2001), 6A
U.L.A. 424 (2008) (“A limited partner does not have any fiduciary duty to the limited
partnership or to any other partner solely by reason of being a limited partner.”).
148. Compare UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409, 6B U.L.A. 597–98 (2008) (“A member’s
[and manager’s] duty of loyalty . . . is limited to . . . account[ing] to the
company[,] . . . refrain[ing] from dealing with the company[,] . . . [and] refrain[ing] from
competing with the company[,] . . . [and a] member’s [and manager’s] duty of care . . . is
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”), with UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (amended 1997),
6 U.L.A. 143 (2001) (same, for partners and partnerships). Interestingly, the ULLCA
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fiduciary duties of managers in a manager-managed LLC and
members in a member-managed LLC in several important
respects. First, the duty of care is simple negligence rather than
gross negligence, but the business judgment rule applies.149
Parties may opt out of the statutory standard of care, but the
standard of care cannot be completely eliminated, and the new
standard of care may not be “manifestly unreasonable” and may
not “authorize intentional misconduct or knowing violation of
law.”150 As for the duty of loyalty, the new Act lists the same
specific prohibitions as in RUPA, ULPA, and the original
ULLCA, but does not make the list exclusive.151 The original
approach was to “cabin” the duty of loyalty to prohibit only
specified transactions, but the drafters of the new Act “decided
that: (i) the ‘corral’ created by RUPA does not fit in the very
complex and variegated world of LLCs; and (ii) it is impracticable
to cabin all LLC-related fiduciary duties within a statutory
formulation.”152 In addition, the new Act eliminated the confusing
inconsistency of RUPA by omitting the RUPA, ULLCA, and
ULPA provisions that allowed a partner to do business with and
lend money to the entity.153
E. Underlying Theories of Fiduciary Duty in the Business and
Trust Contexts
“As law goes, fiduciary doctrine is long on generalities and
154
short on substance.”
One critical difference between the duties of a trustee and
the duties of a corporate fiduciary is the extent to which the
duties may be waived. The theoretical discussions of the nature
of the fiduciary duty generally offer some insight into the role of
waivability of duties in both contexts. The nature of the fiduciary
picked up the RUPA language that specifically authorizes a member to make loans to and
transact other business with the company. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(f) (amended
2006), 6B U.L.A. 597–98 (2008); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143
(2001). This is understandable in the member-managed LLC, which is more like a general
partnership, but puzzling for manager-managed LLCs, which are more like limited
partnerships.
149. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(c) & cmt. (c) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 489–90
(2008).
150. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110(d), (g) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 443–44 (2008).
151. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 & cmts. (a)–(b) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 488–90
(2008).
152. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmts. (a)–(b) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 490
(2008).
153. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(e) & cmt. (e) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 489,
491–92 (2008).
154. Hillman, supra note 11, at 442.
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principle is regularly debated by scholars,155 and a common theme is
whether fiduciary duties are mandatory duties, required by the
relationship, or only implied contract terms, which the law imposes
because the parties would have included them as express terms if
they would have been aware of their necessity.156 Under the latter
theory, fiduciary rules are default rules and can be waived by
157
express terms of the contract. Proponents of this theory, the socalled “contractarians,” argue that fiduciary duty is just a gap-filler
contract term.158 As explained by Easterbrook and Fischel:
When the task is complex, when efforts will span a
substantial time, . . . a detailed contract would be silly.
When one party hires the other’s knowledge and expertise,
there is not much they can write down. Instead of specific
undertakings, the agent [(the manager in corporations, the
trustee in the law of trusts)] assumes a duty of loyalty in
pursuit of the objective and a duty of care [(prudence in the
law of trusts)] in performance . . . [T]he process is
contractual—because both principal and agent enter this
understanding for gain . . . .
. . . [A] “fiduciary” relation is a contractual one
characterized by unusually high costs of specification and
monitoring. The duty of loyalty replaces detailed
159
contractual terms . . . .
Under this theory, the parties to the relationship should be free
to weigh the agency costs, e.g., the costs of delegating management
of assets to a person other than the owner, which are lessened by
fiduciary duty, against the costs of heightened liability of the
fiduciary created by fiduciary duties.160 If there is little risk that the
fiduciary will abuse the power, then the agency costs are low and
the beneficiary would want to, and should be able to, waive the
higher level of fiduciary duties, which are expensive.161

155. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 69, at 130–32 (describing the beliefs of “three
schools of thought . . . on the development of fiduciary duties in corporate law: the
contractarians, . . . anti-contractarians, and the self-styled centrists”); see also Smith,
supra note 13, at 1401–02 (proposing a “unified theory of fiduciary duty”).
156. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1231–32
(1995).
157. See id.; Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 448–50 (1998).
158. Dickerson, supra note 69, at 112, 130; Frankel, supra note 156, at 1231–32.
159. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 426–27.
160. See id. at 426–27 (citing to Coase and describing the fiduciary relationship as a
contractual one, having high transaction and monitoring costs that the parties should
weigh in making an agreement).
161. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 546 (1997).
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Other theorists have objected to the contractarian approach
and assert that fiduciary duties are mandatory, required by the
162
Under this view,
imbalance of power in the relationship.
although the duties can perhaps be reduced, they cannot be
eliminated by contract.163 These commentators argue that
fiduciary duties are unlike contractual duties, in that they are
imposed in some circumstances even if the parties would have
waived or in fact attempted to waive them, in order to avoid
abuse of power.164 Under this view, the vertical nature of
fiduciary relationships, as opposed to the presumed horizontal,
equal-bargaining-power relationship of contracting parties,
requires an external imposition of protections.165
These two positions have been discussed at length in both
the trust and business fiduciary context and in the corporate
fiduciary context. The contractarian approach has had a
significant tangible effect on the evolution of business entity
statutes addressing fiduciary duties.166 The evolving view of the
167
business entity as a “nexus of contracts,” growing out of the
influence of economics on business law encouraged by Ronald H.
Coase’s famous article, The Nature of the Firm,168 gave rise to the
general contractarian theory of corporations, which posits that no
rules governing corporations should be mandatory, and that
parties should be free to create their own contract with minimal
169
judicial or statutory requirements. The primary justification for
the contractarian view is cost: mandatory rules, particularly
fiduciary duty rules, will increase the parties’ transaction costs,
170
which will in turn be passed on to consumers. The overarching

162. Alexander, supra note 29, at 776–77.
163. E.g., id. at 776; Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 921–23. See generally Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary
Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999) (describing fiduciary
relationships to be grounded in areas outside of contract law and utility theories).
164. DeMott, supra note 163, at 887; see also Alexander, supra note 29, at 777–78.
165. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 776–78; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 249 (1995); FitzGibbon, supra
note 163, at 338.
166. See Dickerson, supra note 69, at 136–40.
167. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); Douglas M. Branson,
Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty
Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 395 n.95 (1988).
168. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 547–48, 552 (2003). See generally R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
169. See Miller, supra note 116, at 1615–17.
170. Dickerson, supra note 144, at 453–55; Miller, supra note 116, at 1618; Ribstein,
supra note 161, at 541–44.
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contractarian view of business organizations embraced the
contractarian view of the fiduciary principle. This view took hold
in Delaware, resulting in statutes that severely limit fiduciary
duties of business managers and allow for almost complete
contractual waiver.171 The contractarian approach, as codified,
applies equally to public corporations as well as closely held
172
corporations, with some exceptions, and has also been extended
to unincorporated business associations, as noted above.173
The contractarian view has also been raised in the context of
174
trustee duties, which is the strictest of fiduciary roles. It is
difficult to support the notion of freedom of contract in this
context, because the fiduciary principle is here intended to
protect the interests of the beneficiaries, who had no part in the
contract. However, John Langbein has argued that the intent of
the trustor can be diluted by strict application of the duty of
loyalty, and that the mandatory duty should bend in the face of
contrary trustor intent.175
Professor Langbein’s position has yet to make an impact
on judicial decisions, but codifications of the duty of loyalty in
the trust arena have to some extent cut back on the common
law duty. The Uniform Trust Code (UTC), adopted in twentythree states,176 codifies the duty of loyalty and changes the self177
dealing rule to apply only to transactions with the actual
trustee.178 Common law would extend the self-dealing
prohibition to close affiliates of the trustee,179 but the UTC
provides that for close-affiliate transactions, the trustee can
defend the self-dealing by arguing fairness of the transaction,
a defense traditionally not available for self-dealing.180

171. See Miller, supra note 116, at 1615–17.
172. The oppression doctrine, discussed infra notes 221–223 and accompanying text,
is one exception.
173. See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text.
174. Langbein, supra note 24, at 658–59.
175. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or
Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 980–82 (2005); see also Langbein, supra note 24, at 659.
176. Legislative
Fact
Sheet—Trust
Code,
UNIFORM
L.
COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Apr. 8,
2012).
177. See supra notes 34–44 and accompanying text.
178. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 & cmt. (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 588–89, 590–91
(2006).
179. See Langbein, supra note 175, at 979 (arguing that the Uniform Trust Code is a
departure from the common law’s sole interest rule “in favor of a standard that recognizes
circumstances in which the overlap of interest may benefit the beneficiary”).
180. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(c)–(d) & cmt. (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 588–89, 591
(2006); Boxx, supra note 26, at 298–99.
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The debate rages on in the realm of business organizations.
The contractarians seem to be carrying the day, in light of the
current statutes, but the position is continually criticized by
181
In particular, the extension of the contractarian
scholars.
approach to closely held business entities has been criticized,
primarily based on the differences between the relationship of a
publicly held corporation’s managers and its shareholders and
the relationship between managers and owners of closely held
entities.182 The most recent of the uniform statutes, RULLCA,
183
showed a retreat from the strict contractarian approach, but
was also criticized for adding the business judgment rule, thus
diluting the move toward a more stringent duty.184 The trend,
however, seems to be in the direction of continued loosening of
the mandatory duties, and that punctilio of honor continues to
retreat in the face of market forces.185 The theoretical
underpinnings of statutory definitions of the duty thus
demonstrate that the gap between trustee duties and those of
business fiduciaries will stay wide, continuing to obscure the
dual-role fiduciary’s proper course of action.
F. Comparison of the Various Definitions of Fiduciary Duty
It is tempting for courts faced with the dual-purpose
fiduciary simply to reach for the stricter duty, assuming that is
the safe choice. However, the relaxed standard for business
fiduciaries is not just a result of honoring freedom of contract,
but in fact protects key aspects of successful business
management. To prevent a court from reaching for the
deceptively simple and seemingly safe choice, it is imperative to
analyze the reasons for the gaps between the two categories of
duties and the purposes that fiduciary duties play in each.
The basis of general rules governing a fiduciary’s behavior is
an assumption that in order to act in the beneficiary’s interest,
the fiduciary must eliminate and avoid any conflicting personal

181. E.g., Dibadj, supra note 8, at 458–59, 475–76 (criticizing the contractarian
approach for “muddl[ing] doctrine, espous[ing] antiquated economics, and reflect[ing] poor
public policy”); Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A Response to
Professor Hynes, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 70 (1995).
182. E.g., Sandra K. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to
Protect the Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Parties, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 243, 255–57
(2009) (highlighting the “asymmetries in information” and inequalities between parties to
transactions involving closely held business entities).
183. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text.
184. Campbell, supra note 8, at 30, 42.
185. Dibadj, supra note 8, at 455–56.
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interests.186 This is in contrast to parties to a contract, who are
expected to have self-interests in the transaction and are bound
only by a duty of good faith not to pursue those interests
187
unfairly. There is undoubtedly a level of self-interest with
fiduciaries; however, trustees are allowed to charge fees, and
corporate managers work for salaries and are likely to have
188
personal investments in the business enterprise. The problem
lies in defining how much self-interest ought to be tolerated.
The agency cost of the relationship is the lack of monitoring
that would prevent the fiduciary from pursuing self-interest to an
189
To
unfair degree and taking advantage of the position.
compensate for the lack of monitoring, the fiduciary principle
imposes heightened duties and liabilities to work as a
disincentive.190 For example, if a trustee is not subject to the no
191
further inquiry rule, then a trustee may be tempted to self-deal.
She might give herself a “sweetheart” deal, with the knowledge
that it is likely the transaction will not come to light, and that if
it did, she would only have to compensate the trust for its loss
(i.e., the difference between fair price and what the trustee
actually paid). The no further inquiry rule increases the extent of
liability exposure, shifts the focus from making the victim whole
to punishing the wrongdoer, and requires a self-dealing trustee
to disgorge any profit that the trustee may have made.192 The
193
increased exposure to liability acts as a monitoring substitute.
Viewed with this purpose in mind, the extent of the lack of
monitoring should dictate the strictness of the fiduciary duty.194

186. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1686 (1990).
187. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 775–76 (comparing the weaker “good-faith
obligation” in the contract setting to a fiduciary’s higher duty of loyalty, noting that “[t]he
picture that emerges from the case law is that in contractual relationships the duty is
‘don’t screw the other side,’ but with regard to fiduciary relationships the demand to the
fiduciary is ‘protect your beneficiary, not yourself’”).
188. Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy,
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 908–09.
189. See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2761 n.1, 2770–71 (2006) (arguing that the best way to reduce
agency costs is to employ a monitoring mechanism for the agency’s actions).
190. Id. at 2768.
191. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
192. Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary
Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001); see also Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at
1070–71 (discussing no further inquiry rule’s punishment for disloyalty); Sitkoff, supra
note 30, at 573–74 (discussing the no further inquiry rule’s disgorgement remedy).
193. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 1051–53, 1069.
194. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 432–34 (chronicling the “differences
across the many kinds of [fiduciary] endeavors” by examining various examples).
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Trustees generally hold the highest duty because they are not
supervised by courts, and while they can be monitored by the
beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are often young, incapacitated, or
otherwise unsophisticated, and their source of information is the
195
trustee. By contrast, business entity fiduciaries are subject to
more scrutiny. If the entity is publicly traded, they are subject to
government oversight; and if a private entity, it is likely that the
beneficiaries to the fiduciary relationship are involved directly with
the business.196
Another difference is that, in the corporate fiduciary
setting, conflicting personal interests are unavoidable because
the business fiduciary will generally have a larger personal
stake than the trustee, either because the fiduciary’s role is
full-time employment, or because the fiduciary is personally
invested in the enterprise.197 A trustee, on the other hand,
generally is not a full-time position, and the trustee generally
does not have a financial stake in the trust.198 The introduction
of personal interests in the business fiduciary setting justifies
the lessening of the duty in part because the fiduciary should
have the right to protect his or her own stake in the
enterprise, and in part because the fiduciary’s personal stake
will cause the fiduciary to exercise care in management and
thus provide some protection to the beneficiary’s interest, a
manifestation of the “rising tide lifts all boats” aphorism.
199
Also, the trustee’s fees are usually fixed, in contrast to
the business fiduciary (who is likely to receive incentive
compensation), so the business fiduciary has more incentive to
increase the value of the asset.200

195. CARYL A. YZENBAARD, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481, at 211–14, 238 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing the importance of
the high standards for fiduciaries in relationships such as guardianships and conservatorships).
196. THOMAS LEE HAZAN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.1[2] (6th ed. 2009); see
also JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZAN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 14.15 (3d ed. 2011)
(noting an emergence of “partnership-like fiduciary obligations running between the
participants in close corporations”).
197. See Dickerson, supra note 69, at 118.
198. Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1024 (1981); see also AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT &
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1, at 11 (3d ed. 2007) (noting
that it is only in rare cases that the beneficiary is allowed to enjoy the trust property). However,
it is not uncommon for a beneficiary of the trust to also serve as trustee, particularly in family
settings. Langbein, supra note 175, at 938. That situation offers its own complications.
199. MARY F. RADFORD, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 975, at 5 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that forty-eight state compensation
statutes provide for trust fee-fixing).
200. See 1 RADIN, supra note 66, at 321 (“Stock options provide a frequent form of
director and officer compensation.”).

Do Not Delete

2012]

4/29/2012 5:25 PM

TOO MANY TIARAS

263

Other contrasts between the trust beneficiary and the
protected party in a business entity include the likelihood that a
business investor is diversified and can exit the relationship
201
easily, whereas a trust beneficiary’s interest in the trust is
more likely to be a greater percentage of his or her wealth and
more difficult (if not impossible) to reinvest if unhappy with the
202
trustee’s performance. The number of potential enforcers of the
duties also affects the level of required duty in the trust and
business contexts. In a publicly held corporation, shareholders
are so numerous and their percentage holdings are generally so
insignificant that they lack the power and the incentive to
litigate breaches of duty.203 This may be one explanation why the
movement in the law of business entities is to dilute fiduciary
duty, even in light of the recent corporate scandals.204 On the
other hand, where there are only a few beneficiaries or a few
shareholders, in the case of a closely held corporation, the stakes
are higher and the relationships more likely to be personal,
increasing the likelihood that the beneficiaries would be
motivated to litigate.205
If the difference in level of duty between a trustee and a
business fiduciary is attributable only to a concern about freedom
of contract and to the lower need for fiduciary penalties to control
the behavior of business fiduciaries, then simply imposing the
higher duty of trustee on the dual-purpose fiduciary would
appear to be the obvious answer. However, the lesser duty of the
business fiduciary plays an important role in enhancing the
fiduciary’s performance.
An overly strict enforcement of the fiduciary duty in the
business setting may lead to over-cautious behavior, desirable in
a trust setting but undesirable in a business setting where risks
are necessary for long-term success of an enterprise. The drafters
of the Model Business Corporation Act supported inclusion of
exculpatory provisions so that “directors would not be

201. ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2006).
202. See Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 573–75.
203. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 679 (noting that the primary beneficiary of
shareholder actions is often the lawyers, due to shareholders’ “little incentive to reckon
the costs and benefits of litigation”).
204. John A. Pearce & Ilya A. Lipin, The Duties of Directors and Officers Within the
Fuzzy Zone of Insolvency, AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 361, 374 (2011) (“[R]ulings from
Delaware, California, and Louisiana courts suggest a legal trend of limiting and
eliminating the directors’ and officers’ duties to creditors while in the zone of
insolvency.”).
205. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 679.
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discouraged from fully and freely carrying out their duties,
including responsible entrepreneurial risk-taking.”206 A trustee’s
responsibility regarding investment of the assets is tilted toward
207
The duty includes the duty to
conservation of the assets.
208
diversify, in order to reduce the beneficiary’s risk and perhaps
in response to the concern that the trust assets may represent all
or a significant portion of the beneficiary’s assets. Beyond
diversification, the trustee is now allowed to take more risks
than previously allowed, but only because some risk is now
209
considered necessary to preserve value. The trustee is expected
to follow “modern portfolio theory,” investing with an eye to the
entire return.210 Under this approach, the trustee must take on
some risk in order to keep the core value of the trust in pace with
inflation, but must exercise caution in light of the beneficiaries’
circumstances.211
This conservative approach would be disastrous in most
business settings. The business manager must prudently protect
capital sufficient for the business’s needs, but the primary concern
must be the business rather than the investment of the owners and
the owners’ individual risk tolerance. The justification behind the
business judgment rule is that courts are not in a position to assess
the reasonableness of a business decision,212 whereas courts are
comfortable evaluating a trustee’s performance of the more
213
straightforward task of maintaining a portfolio’s value.
If a
business manager were subject to the broad and indefinite fiduciary
206. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) & cmt. 2.I (2010); see also Fairfax, supra
note 86, at 449 (“[S]cholars claim that too much personal liability is quite simply bad for
business because it undermines the innovation necessary for businesses to thrive.”).
207. Uniform Prudent Investor Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.nccusl.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Prudent%20Investor%20Act (last visited
Mar. 25, 2012) (requiring investors to “invest as a prudent investor would invest” and
noting that a “reasonable approach” to investment of trust assets is one that “preserv[es]
trust assets”).
208. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7B U.L.A. 29 (2006); see supra notes 61–63
and accompanying text.
209. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2, 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006) (providing a series of
factors that should weigh in a trustee’s investment decisions “as part of an overall
investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust”).
210. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 3 (2006); see also
JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 17–18 (2d ed.
1998) (explaining that, under modern portfolio theory, “risk and return” are balanced to
compensate investors appropriately “for accepting greater risks through the promise of
higher returns”).
211. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2, 7B U.L.A. 20 (2006); Uniform Prudent
Investor Act Summary, supra note 207.
212. 1 RADIN, supra note 66, at 35.
213. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust
Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & ECON. 681, 686–87 (2007).
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duties of a trustee, he would react by acting conservatively in order
to best avoid liability. But that conservative behavior can ultimately
damage the growth and survival of the enterprise.
Another factor to consider is that within the realm of
business fiduciaries, there is a broad range of interests. A
shareholder in a large publicly traded corporation has different
concerns than the limited partners in a family-owned limited
liability company, even though as noted above, the fiduciary
duties of the managers of such enterprises do not vary
significantly.214
There are some settings, however, where fiduciaries of close
corporations have been held to standards closer to those of
215
trustee. The classic case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
illustrates the inhibiting nature of enforcing a strict fiduciary
duty in a close corporation. In Donahue, a minority shareholder
complained when the company redeemed shares of Harry Rodd,
its retiring president, director, and former controlling
shareholder.216 The redemption resulted in Rodd’s children
controlling the company.217 The minority shareholder argued that
she should have had an equivalent opportunity to redeem her
shares.218 The court held that the majority shareholders owed a
duty of “utmost good faith and loyalty” to the minority
219
shareholders. The higher standard of Donahue has been diluted
in ensuing years, however, replacing the heightened fiduciary
duty with the tort of freeze-out and the shareholder oppression
220
doctrine. A freeze-out theory requires proof that the majority
shareholder intentionally set out to deprive the minority of all
benefits of stock ownership.221 Shareholder oppression is
primarily statutory and provides causes of action to minority
shareholders against majority owners who engage in fraudulent,
illegal, or oppressive conduct.222
214. See supra Part II.E (discussing the gap between the trustee fiduciary duties and
the business fiduciary duties).
215. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
216. Id. at 508–10.
217. Id. at 510.
218. Id. at 511.
219. Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Mitchell, supra note 186, at 1714–17.
221. Id. at 1720; see also, e.g., Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 7–8 (1st Cir.
1986) (setting forth the test minority shareholders must meet to establish a freeze-out
claim).
222. Mitchell, supra note 186, at 1716 n.168; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-940(a)(1)
(2003); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 3-413(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.751 subdiv.1 (b)(2) (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(1)(a) (2009);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(ii) (2006).
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Commentators have lamented the application of the
contractarian approach of minimal, waivable duties to the closely
held organization, pointing out that the situations of vulnerable
owners in those organizations are more akin to trust
223
beneficiaries than shareholders of public corporations. In this
context, minority owners have a much larger personal stake in
the enterprise and will often have little real bargaining power in
the initial creation of waivers.224 The variations in the business
fiduciary roles further demonstrate the tension between the
complete abrogation of duties under the assumption of freedom of
contract and the need to retain flexibility of the managers to
make key business decisions. It also illustrates that courts have
been willing to fashion rules to fit the special circumstances of a
small business, thus setting precedent to develop a unique
approach to the dual-role fiduciary.
III. WHEN ONE PERSON ACTS IN TWO FIDUCIARY CAPACITIES
The following cases illustrate the various problems
encountered in cases of a dual fiduciary: the dangers to a
beneficiary when the fiduciary tries to rely on the more lax set of
duties; the difficult choices a fiduciary must make to avoid
liability, to the detriment of the business enterprise; and the
confusion of courts when evaluating the conduct of dual
fiduciaries. Not surprisingly, the level of the fiduciary’s
culpability and bad faith seems to affect the standard applied by
the court, but the holdings often do not present adequate rules
for future cases where the fiduciary’s conduct is more or less
egregious. Several of the cases, however, point the way to
development of a new approach that recognizes the dual fiduciary
as a distinct category and balances the interests of the
beneficiaries and the business entity.
A. The Estate of Harry Winston
Harry Winston’s estate plan is an archetypal illustration of
how the same conduct by a fiduciary can be analyzed very
differently depending on the type of fiduciary involved. The case
demonstrates the dangers of the current approach defining the two

223. See Dibadj, supra note 8, at 461, 465–69, 474.
224. Id. at 467–68. For example, the minority stakeholders may have received their
shares as gifts. It is not uncommon for a parent to form an LLC, reducing the duties as
much as statutorily possible, retain management control, and gift the equity interests to
children. This can be particularly risky if the parent then turns management power over
to only one of the children.
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fiduciary roles separately. The categorization of a fiduciary as one or
another type allows a dual fiduciary to use the lower set of duties to
excuse favoring his own interests over the trust beneficiary’s.
Harry Winston was the internationally famous jeweler known
for such exploits as donating the Hope Diamond to the Smithsonian
(mailing it via registered mail).225 He also labored to smuggle
diamonds out of Europe just after the outbreak of World War II, his
wife helping to keep them out of the hands of the Nazis by putting
226
diamonds in her girdle. When it came time to prepare his estate
plan in 1968, Harry’s family consisted of his wife, Edna, and his two
sons, Ronald and Bruce, both young adults at the time.227 The 1968
Will treated Bruce and Ronald equally, giving each of them
$600,000 outright upon his death.228 The Will further provided that
one-half of his common stock in Harry Winston, Inc. (HWI) would
be converted to cumulative, nonvoting preferred shares and given to
the Harry Winston Foundation, Inc.229 The remaining one-half of the
common shares would be placed in trust for Edna, to the extent
230
such a gift would qualify for the then-existing marital deduction,
and upon Edna’s death the remainder of such trust was subject to
Edna’s general power of appointment,231 and in default of Edna
exercising her power of appointment, the remainder would be
distributed to Harry’s then-living issue.232 The executors and
trustees named in the Will were Gerald Schultz, a “friend and
business associate,” William Rogers, a “friend and attorney,” and
Bankers Trust Company.233 Ronald was named as an alternate to
either Mr. Schultz or Mr. Rogers.234
In 1971, Harry executed a First Codicil, changing the
disposition of the remainder of Edna’s trust.235 Under the 1968

225. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 49.
226. Id.
227. See Will of Harry Winston 1–3 (June 27, 1968) (on file with Houston Law Review).
228. Id. at 2–3.
229. Id. at 8, 11.
230. Id. at 8–10. At the time, this equaled 50% of the gross estate.
231. Id. at 10 (“[A]s she may appoint by a will, specifically referring to and exercising
this power of appointment, in favor of her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her
estate, or any other appointee or appointees, in further trust or otherwise.”). A general
power of appointment grants a person the right to direct distribution of certain property
to anyone, including himself or herself. The Internal Revenue Code defines a general
power of appointment as “a power which is exercisable in favor of the [donee], his estate,
his creditors or the creditors of his estate.” I.R.C § 2041(b) (2006).
232. Will of Harry Winston, supra note 227, at 10.
233. Id. at 12.
234. Id.
235. See generally First Codicil to Will of Harry Winston (Feb. 19, 1971) [hereinafter
First Codicil] (on file with Houston Law Review).
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Will, when Edna died, Bruce and Ronald (assuming they were
both living at Edna’s death) would have received one-half of
Edna’s trust, which would have consisted of all of the common
voting stock of Harry Winston, Inc. outright.236 The 1971 Codicil
changed that to put Bruce’s share in trust.237 Every five years
following Edna’s death, Bruce would receive one-fifth of the trust
principal outright, until the last payment upon the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Edna’s death.238 A Second Codicil was signed by
Harry later in 1971, making changes relating to tax issues, and
in 1972 a Third Codicil was signed, disposing of his residence and
the contents of the home.239
In 1975, Harry revised his Will one last time before his
240
death. In this codicil, he gave Ronald the final say in management
of the company by replacing William Rogers with Ronald as one of
the three executors and trustees, and further providing that:
If at any time a dispute shall arise in respect of the
administration of any trust created by this Will, I direct my
trustees to take such action with respect to the matter in
dispute as my son, RONALD WINSTON, while serving as
trustee hereunder, shall determine; and in taking such
action, I direct that all my other trustees shall be entirely
free, as individuals and fiduciaries hereunder, from all
responsibility or liability for any losses sustained by the
241
trust as a consequence thereof.
The changes in his estate plan reflected Harry Winston’s
perception of his sons’ abilities and interests. Harry Winston
supposedly once told his sister-in-law, Lillian Winston, “I have two
242
sons[,] . . . [o]ne is a genius and one is a moron.” Ronald Winston
graduated from Harvard and worked in rocket science for a time243
before joining the family business in his late 20s, at the request of
244
his father. Bruce, who is four years younger than his brother,

236. Will of Harry Winston, supra note 227, at 8–9.
237. First Codicil, supra note 235, at 3–4.
238. Id.
239. Second Codicil to Will of Harry Winston 1–3 (Apr. 16, 1971) (on file with
Houston Law Review); Third Codicil to Will of Harry Winston 1–4 (Dec. 1, 1972) (on file
with Houston Law Review).
240. Fourth Codicil to Will of Harry Winston (Feb. 3, 1975) (on file with Houston
Law Review).
241. Id. at 1–2.
242. Wadler, supra note 2.
243. The New York Times article states that his rocket propulsion studies were at
MIT. Id. But in the New York Magazine article, Nina Burleigh states that the rocket
studies were at NYU. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 48.
244. Wadler, supra note 2.
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dropped out of college to lead a life of “relative leisure,”245 although
according to his lawyer, he was active in the business in the 1960s
and early 1970s.246 Bruce has been described as “notoriously laid247
back” and a “very sweet guy,” while Ronald is described as a
“workaholic,” “very secretive,” and prone to “long-range thinking.”248
The Winston family therefore presented a classic paradigm:
a family-owned business, with one driven, hardworking child
interested in carrying on the business and another child who is
more of a free spirit, not interested in continuing the family’s
business legacy but who remains in the parents’ good graces.
Harry Winston’s solution to this estate planning dilemma was
also standard: split the estate equally but put the hardworking
249
child in charge.
Harry Winston died in 1978, and until Edna’s death in 1986,
250
Ronald managed the business with no apparent family dissension.
Edna became incapacitated shortly after Harry’s death, and her
sons moved her to Florida in 1979 and were appointed co-guardians
for her by a Florida court.251 In 1983, Bruce and Ronald as coguardians petitioned the court for approval to transfer all of Edna’s
separate assets into the trust set up for her benefit under Harry’s
Will.252 Ronald asserted that the reason for the transfer was to save
on taxes in Edna’s estate, but a very significant effect of the
253
requested transfer fell on Bruce. Under Edna’s Will, Bruce was
entitled to receive one-half of her assets outright at her death.254
However, his share of the trust set up under Harry’s Will was to be
255
held in trust for up to twenty-five years following Edna’s death.
The transfer therefore meant that Bruce’s share of his mother’s
assets was moved to his brother’s control as his trustee.256
Apparently, Bruce did not understand this at the time, and in 1991,

245. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 49.
246. Wadler, supra note 2.
247. Burleigh, supra note 1, at 49.
248. Id. at 48–49.
249. See Fox, supra note 10, at 9-11 to -12, -23 (describing placing the family
business in a trust and also describing various forms of passing down a business, giving
as examples: (1) putting one child in control of Forbes Magazine by leaving 51% to the
oldest son Steve, and leaving the remainder of interests to the other four children; (2) and
the Beretta family gun manufacturing business).
250. Michael A. Riccardi, Deal Closes 12-Year Battle for Jeweler’s Estate, N.Y. L.J.,
July 25, 2000, at 1, 8.
251. Winston v. Winston, 684 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 316–17.
254. Id. at 316.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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after Edna’s death, Bruce brought suit in Florida to undo the
transfer, claiming that Ronald had committed fraud.257 The court of
appeals, however, found insufficient evidence of fraud, in light of the
fact that the Wills of his parents and the opportunity for
independent counsel were available to Bruce, and it refused to
invalidate the transaction.258
After Harry’s death, the executors carried out the
instructions of his Will and reorganized HWI, creating 100
shares of preferred stock and 100 shares of voting common
stock.259 Ninety-five shares of preferred were distributed to the
Harry Winston Research Foundation, which in turn donated
the shares to the Genetic Research Trust, an entity “created
and allegedly controlled by Ronald.”260 Ninety shares of
common stock were placed in the trust for Edna, and the
261
remaining shares were redeemed to pay expenses.
The
“preferred stock [was] entitled to a guaranteed annual
dividend of . . . $332,500.”262 Payment of this dividend was at
the discretion of HWI management, but the common stock
could not receive a dividend until all accrued but unpaid
dividends owed on the preferred were paid.263
Until Edna’s death in 1986, the ratio of preferred to
common stock remained constant—ninety-five shares of
preferred to ninety shares of common, so the equity position of
the two types of stock was essentially the same. However, after
Edna’s death, the trust started redeeming common shares to
pay Edna’s estate taxes and expenses.264 By 1990, the trust

257. Id. at 317.
258. See id. at 320 (“By our reversal, we neither condone nor condemn Ronald’s
actions. Ronald urges us to exonerate him and find no fraud existed as a matter of law,
but it is unnecessary for the resolution of this appeal to reweigh the evidence to determine
whether Ronald acted as the concerned, dutiful son and brother with intent to maximize
the tax benefits for both his brother and himself or as a knave and scoundrel with intent
to dupe Bruce and maximize his parents’ legacies for himself. We reverse because, as a
matter of law, no extrinsic fraud has been demonstrated . . . .”). The Florida litigation
resulted in discipline by the Florida Bar of one of Bruce’s lawyers, Edward H. Wohl, for
his participation in paying a consulting fee to a former employee of the Winston family
business who was a fact witness in the proceeding. Florida Bar v. Wohl, 842 So. 2d 811,
814 (Fla. 2003). David Boies and Bob Silver were the trial attorneys in the Florida
litigation but only Mr. Wohl was a member of the Florida Bar and subject to discipline
there. See id. at 812–13.
259. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1001 (Sur. Ct.), aff’d 636 N.Y.S.2d 635 (App.
Div. 1995).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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owned only seventeen shares of stock, dropping the equity
position of the common from 49% (90/185) to 15% (17/112).265
The corporation had never paid dividends to the common
266
shareholders. Ronald argued that the lack of dividends was
due to a lack of profitability of the company, and in any event
dividends were impossible, because the accrued but unpaid
dividends owed to the preferred stock would have to be paid
first, and then any further dividend paid would have to pay a
267
proportionate share to the preferred shares.
Bruce was
therefore receiving no income from his ownership in the
company.268 Bruce had been employed by the company during
Edna’s lifetime and had been receiving a salary, but Ronald
had subsequently fired him.269 Ronald, however, was being paid
to run the company; his compensation increased from $248,000
270
in 1979 to $1,138,000 in 1990.
Ronald then decided, over the objections of Bruce and the
other trustees, to distribute the stock from Edna’s trust as
follows: Ronald received half the stock, Bruce received 10% of
the stock outright (reflecting his right to a one-fifth
distribution) and the remaining 40% went to the trust for
271
Ronald then had HWI and Bruce’s total
Bruce’s benefit.
interest appraised, using a liquidation value as opposed to the
value if the company was sold as an ongoing business, and
asked for court approval of a sale to him of all of Bruce’s
interests for $4.5 million.272 The price was based on the
appraisals, but the appraisal of Bruce’s one-half interest set
the value of that interest at just a little more than a third of
the total liquidation value.273 Presumably Bruce’s interest was
discounted for marketability and control limitations. The steps
taken by Ronald had therefore made Bruce’s holdings
worthless as long as he or the trust owned them, and thus
deeply discounted the value to Ronald of his holdings in the
event of a buyout.274

265. Id. at 1001–02.
266. Id. at 1002.
267. Id. at 1002–03.
268. Id. at 1003.
269. Id. at 1006–07.
270. Id. at 1002.
271. Id. at 1001.
272. Id. at 1002.
273. See id. (describing how the appraiser valued the total stock at $12 million, but
valued Bruce’s one-half share at $4.5 million).
274. Id. at 1003.
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275
This scenario was a classic “squeeze-out.” A squeeze-out
usually occurs in a closely held corporation where the
276
shareholders work for the company and no dividends are paid.
The majority shareholder can remove a minority shareholder
from the board, terminate the minority shareholder’s
employment with the company, and continue the existing
practice of not paying dividends, thus cutting off the minority
shareholder’s income from the company.277 In this typical
scenario, the terminated minority shareholder can get relief,
depending on the particular facts of the case and the approach
taken by the court, and such relief is usually in the form of a
cash-out at fair market value of the minority shareholder’s
278
interest in the company. Here, Ronald held only 50% of the
shares, but his voting power over the trust’s shares gave him the
same power to freeze out Bruce as the extra 1% ownership would
279
have given. There is a recognized fiduciary duty owed by a
majority shareholder to a minority shareholder that was not
applicable here because the facts were slightly different, but that
fiduciary duty presents another model of analysis in reviewing
the behavior of someone in Ronald’s position.280
Both Bruce and the other trustees objected to Ronald’s
281
actions. The trustees objected to the distribution of stock to
Ronald and Bruce from Edna’s marital trust, concerned that

275. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts,
Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 293, 301 (2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that a “squeeze-out” occurs when a
majority shareholder is able to act against the minority shareholder’s interests).
276. See id. at 300–02.
277. See CLARK, supra note 95, § 12.4 (1986); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and
Freeze-Outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 498 (1995) (“In a
squeeze-out, the majority shareholders use their control to deprive the minority of any
managerial control over, and, of more practical significance, any economic return from, the
corporation.”); Moll, supra note 275, at 302; Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statues:
Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 885 (1995) (describing a classic exclusion of a minority shareholder); see
also Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (summarizing methods of
abuse by majority shareholders); Sandra K. Miller, A Note on the Definition of Oppressive
Conduct by Majority Shareholders: How Can the Reasonable Expectation Standard Be
Reasonably Applied in Pennsylvania?, 12 J.L. & COM. 51, 81–82 (1992) (listing certain acts that
show the existence of oppressive conduct).
278. Oesterle, supra note 277, at 885–86.
279. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (explaining that Ronald could overrule the
majority decision of the trustees).
280. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515–17 (Mass. 1975); see
Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 175, 177 (2004) (noting two legal principles which have supported the application of
fiduciary duties in the shareholder context).
281. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
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there would not be sufficient assets available to pay remaining
fees and expenses in settling the Edna Trust.282 Bruce objected to
the sale of his interest to Ronald based on the liquidation value
283
appraisal. Both Bruce’s appraiser and the court’s appraiser
found that the value based on a sale was at least five times
higher than a liquidation value and that therefore a liquidation
284
value was an inappropriate benchmark. The question before
the court was whether Ronald’s actions were such an abuse of
fiduciary duty that he should lose his veto power granted to him
285
in his father’s Will.
Ronald defended his actions on the grounds that his father’s
primary objective was preserving the company and Ronald’s
continuing management of it, and that everything he had done
was either necessary to carry out this purpose or a consequence
286
foreseeable by Harry. The reviewing court found, however, that
while it agreed that Harry wanted Ronald to continue at the
helm of the business,
for Ronald to conclude from these facts that Harry intended
to vest absolute control of the family enterprise in him for
the balance of his career and to subordinate Bruce’s
inheritance to this alleged dominant and paramount
intention, even at the expense of depriving Bruce of the
benefit and value of his “equal share” of the family fortune,
is simply not supported by a reasonable construction and
287
interpretation of the Will.
The court went on to note that if Harry intended to
288
disinherit Bruce, there were easier ways of doing it. The court
further concluded that the combination of the creation of
preferred stock that was donated to the Foundation (which was
289
according to the court, “a brilliant estate planning device” ) and
the redemption of a large portion of the common stock to pay
Edna’s estate taxes (perhaps not so brilliant290) so decimated
282. Id. The trustees claimed that the distribution of stock was self-motivated and an
abuse of Ronald’s veto power. Id.
283. Id. at 1002.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1003.
286. Id. at 1004–05.
287. Id. at 1005.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1007.
290. Presumably, the trustees could have foreseen the estate tax liability but no
steps seem to have been taken to ameliorate the effects of such a large redemption, such
as paying the tax over an extended period of time under section 6166 of the Internal
Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 6166 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). Without further facts, it is
impossible to tell whether the shrinking of the common stock down to 15% of the company
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Bruce’s one-half interest in the common stock that the only way
he could benefit from ownership was a sale of the business at its
going-concern value, and that the trust had to be distributed in a
manner consistent with Harry’s clear intent that Ronald and
Bruce benefit equally.291 The court ordered the stock returned to
the Edna Trust and removed Ronald’s veto power, holding that
Ronald had an “irreconcilable conflict” because of his status as
trustee, beneficiary, officer, and director of the corporations;
trustee of the Genetic Research Trust; and owner of the preferred
292
shares. Ultimately, the case between the brothers was resolved
when, in 2000, the court approved sale of Bruce’s interests to
Ronald and a group of investors for $54.1 million.293
Ronald’s extreme actions caused the court to dismantle the
management scheme that Harry Winston had created. Ronald
excused the steps he took, which made Bruce’s present interests
in the company virtually worthless, on the grounds that they
were consistent with a corporate fiduciary’s duties. However, he
arguably breached even those lower duties, which acknowledge a
controlling party’s duty to minority owners. The court’s holding,
however, relied on Ronald’s duties as trustee.294 It reasoned that
the various roles Ronald held created an irreconcilable conflict,
implying that Harry Winston’s plan was structurally flawed and
would have failed even if Ronald had been more protective of
295
Bruce’s interests.
Arguably, Ronald’s limitation of Bruce’s
interest pushed the court to emphasize the stricter role, but the
two separate definitions of the fiduciary roles can cause courts to
question whether it is ever permissible to serve as both. Family
business owners in Harry Winston’s position commonly desire
this structure of family ownership and control, so a new category
that protects both beneficiaries and the business entity is
necessary.
B. Other Cases
The case of Rosencrans v. Fry presents an interesting
contrast to Estate of Winston. In Rosencrans, the testator owned

value (which definitely hurt Bruce but perhaps helped Ronald) could have been avoided or
reduced.
291. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
292. Id. at 1008.
293. Riccardi, supra note 250, at 1, 8. Note that Ronald had initially petitioned the
court in the early 1990s to purchase Bruce’s interest for $4.5 million. In re Winston, 631
N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
294. In re Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
295. Id.
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close to 50% of a closely held company, with the remaining
interests held by approximately fifty investors.296 The testator’s
Will left his stock in the company in trust, naming as co-trustees
his wife and William Fry, a long-term employee who had been
running the company since the testator had become less
involved.297 The testator’s wife was the income beneficiary of the
trust, with the remainder of the trust to go to two nephews at her
death.298 The Will also gave to “my friend, William M. Fry, the
right to purchase any or all of said stock at its par value of $25.00
299
Fry was elected president of the company, as
per share.”
requested in the Will, and also served on the board of directors.300
The book value of the shares at the time the Will was signed was
301
over $50 a share. The testator died in 1944, and in 1946, Mr.
Fry tried to exercise the option to buy the shares, but the widow
became so upset he dropped the issue.302 In 1949, he stated his
intention to exercise the option, and the widow took the position
that he could not exercise the option during her lifetime.303
Litigation ensued, and after a judge had entered an oral
determination in favor of Mr. Fry’s right to purchase the shares,
but before a written judgment was entered, the widow and the
two nephews, who were on the board of directors, voted large
cash dividends and stock dividends of 50% and 300% be paid to
304
existing shareholders. Mr. Fry and the other director voted
305
against the dividends. Action on the dividends was enjoined
and ultimately invalidated.306 Once the widow lost on the
question of the enforceability of the option, she asserted a claim
that Mr. Fry had breached his fiduciary duty as trustee, claiming
that he should have voted for larger dividends, in the best
interest of the income beneficiary, and that his option price
should be increased to reflect the improperly undistributed

296. Rosencrans v. Fry, 91 A.2d 162, 166 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952), aff’d 95
A.2d 905 (N.J. 1953).
297. Id. at 163, 167.
298. Id. at 163.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 166.
301. Id. at 167.
302. Id. at 163–64, 168.
303. Id. at 164.
304. Id. at 164–65. The stock dividends were issued because the widow believed that
Mr. Fry’s option to purchase would extend only to the original shares and not the shares
issued pursuant to the stock dividend, which the court in dicta indicated was incorrect. Id.
at 169.
305. Id. at 164.
306. Id. at 165.
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earnings.307 The court’s response to this claim was unusually
pragmatic. It noted that Fry was put by the testator in the
dueling positions of trustee holding stock, and director and
308
president of the company. In addition “[t]o these potentially
divergent obligations, the testator added the complicating factor
of an option in Fry to purchase at a fixed price, unhinged to the
309
true worth of the shares.” The court found it relevant that the
testator had created the conflict and apparently had confidence
that Fry would act fairly in his dual fiduciary roles, even in light
310
of the personal interest of the option added in. Also important
to the court was the fact that the widow was also a co-trustee and
on the board, as well as a beneficiary of the trust, and approved
all actions taken that she was now claiming were a breach of
Fry’s fiduciary duty.311 The pattern of retaining earnings rather
than distributing all earnings as dividends was also not one of
Fry’s creations; it had begun during the testator’s lifetime, and
the testator had approved of the expansion program carried out
after his death that required retention of earnings.312
What is most significant about the Rosencrans decision is
the court’s resolution of the conflict between the fiduciary duty of
trustee and corporate manager. It noted that a trustee holding
stock must vote such stock in a way to promote the beneficiaries’
best interests, but this “principle does not embrace a duty to
advance the interest of a beneficiary at the expense of the
corporation and other outstanding stockholders’ interests.”313 In a
case of a dual fiduciary acting reasonably, the court implicitly
recognized a hybrid set of duties.
In Bartlett v. Dumaine, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
analyzed the duties of trustees in a setting very similar to the
Winston Trust, but with very different results. In that case,
Frederic Dumaine Sr. created the family’s business, the
Amoskeag Company, and during his lifetime created the
Dumaines Trust for the benefit of his children and
314
grandchildren. In addition to the Dumaines Trust, Frederic
Dumaine Sr. also established the Dexter Trust, which was for the
benefit of his son Buck for life, with the remainder to be

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 166–67.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 167–68.
Bartlett v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 5 (N.H. 1986).
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distributed to the Dumaines Trust upon the death of the survivor
of Buck and his father.315 The trusts were funded primarily with
company stock, and according to the court, the elder Dumaine
and his son Buck dominated the company and the trusts, and
persons on the payroll of the company also generally managed
the trust.316 After the death of the father, several of Buck’s
siblings became unsatisfied with their lack of control (and their
brother’s exclusive control) over the family trusts and the
company, and they sought an accounting of the Dexter Trust, on
the theory that, as beneficiaries of the Dumaines Trust, which in
turn was the remainder beneficiary of the Dexter Trust, they had
a right to know the activity in the Dexter Trust.317 In addition,
they alleged various breaches of fiduciary duty on the part of
trustees who also benefited as employees of the company.318
There were two major differences between the Dumaine
trusts and the Winston Trust. First, the trusts were set up
during the elder Dumaine’s lifetime, rather than at his death, as
319
Harry Winston had done. This difference is significant because
the court in Dumaine focused on how the elder Dumaine ran the
trust and the company as an integrated enterprise,320 indicating
“that the settlor intended the trustees of Dumaines, within their
discretion, to take business risks with trust funds in concert with
the Amoskeag Company,”321 and that the prudent person

315. Id. In addition to the Dumaines Trust and the Dexter Trust, there were seven
“satellite trusts,” one for each of Mr. Dumaine’s seven children. Each child was the income
beneficiary of a satellite trust, with the remainder of the trust paid to the Dumaines Trust
on the child’s death. Id.
316. Id. at 5–6, 13.
317. Id. at 6, 14.
318. The specific allegations of fiduciary breaches were: (1) a $4 million unsecured
loan from the trust to one of the company’s subsidiaries; (2) the purchase of a yacht from a
subsidiary by a trustee who was also a company officer, and an interest-free loan from the
company to the same company officer as well as a very favorable employment contract
with the officer; (3) payment of over $1 million in management fees from the trust to the
company; and (4) the conflicts of interest inherent in several trustees also holding
positions in the company. Id. at 6–13.
319. Id. at 5; cf. Will of Harry Winston, supra note 227, at 8–11.
320. Bartlett, 523 A.2d at 8. The court did not discuss the potential impropriety of
Mr. Dumaine Sr.’s actions with regard to the trust because all beneficial interests were
held by his children and grandchildren, and yet trust assets seemed available to invest in
the company’s various enterprises. For example, the report of the master presiding over
the hearing found that the trust had “features of both a trust and a corporation,” and that
the general intent of the settlor was to give the trustees “absolute control of trust property
and trust business.” Id. However, the beneficiaries must have some rights to enforce the
trustees’ duties towards them or there is no trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 25
(1959) (“No trust is created unless the settlor manifests an intention to impose enforceable
duties.”).
321. Bartlett, 523 A.2d at 8.
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standard of investment normally imposed on trustees did not
therefore apply.322 The court, in analyzing the propriety of the
trustees’ actions, noted that this was not a “normal” trust, and
the conflicts of interest were “inherent in the declared scheme of
the settlor.”323 Such inherent conflicts were present in the scheme
that Harry Winston’s estate plan contemplated, but the settlor’s
intent to allow such conflicts in Dumaine was ratified by the
settlor’s own participation in that scheme during his lifetime.324
The second difference was that the children in Dumaine
could not point to specific damages such as those in the Winston
325
The conflicts of interest had not resulted in any
case.
significant damage; for example, the unsecured loan of $4 million
made by the trust to a company subsidiary that was in financial
trouble was in fact repaid.326 This may have contributed to the
court’s remarkably relaxed standard in judging the trustees’
actions.327
The courts in Rosencrans and Bartlett both acknowledged an
adjustment in a trustee’s strict duties to accommodate the business
entity’s interest. In Perry v. Perry, however, another case where the
trustees’ alleged breaches caused no great harm, the court applied
328
the lower corporate fiduciary standard. A grandson of the trustor
challenged the actions of his uncles as trustees and directors of the
329
family company whose stock was owned by the trust. The history

322. Id. at 7–8; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE
§ 227(a) (1992) (“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the
funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. This standard requires the exercise of
reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is to be applied to Investments not in isolation but in
the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should
incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.”) (statement of the more
modern “prudent investor” standard); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (1959) (“In
making investments of trust funds the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in the absence
of provisions in the terms of the trust or of a statute otherwise providing, to make such
investments and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property
having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to
be derived.”) (traditional prudent person investment rule).
323. Bartlett, 523 A.2d at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
324. Id. at 5–6.
325. Id. at 15–16.
326. Id. at 7.
327. See Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and
Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2748 & n.104 (2006) (citing Bartlett v.
Dumaine as support for the point that although there is a general perception that courts
enforce exculpatory clauses in trust agreements, upon review of the cases courts in fact
only enforce in limited circumstances showing no unfairness, or in instances where the
trustee was not a professional).
328. Perry v. Perry, 160 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Mass. 1959).
329. Id. at 99–100.
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of the trust and company management (including periods
during the trustor’s lifetime) was replete with self-dealing and
conflicts, such as no-interest loans from the company to the
trustees–directors, business dealings between the company and
businesses owned directly by trustees–directors that were very
profitable to the trustees–directors owning the separate business,
and similar transactions.330 However, the court found that the
transactions had not caused significant damage to the trust and
that there was no actual fraud or bad faith.331 The court expressly
applied the lesser standard of conduct of directors, rather than
trustees, to the trustees–directors, stating that “[t]here is no
basis on the findings for disregarding the corporate entity in
determining the obligations of the officers of the corporation who
were also trustees.”332 Clearly, if the stricter trustee standards
had been applied, including the no further inquiry rule, the
trustees would have been answerable to the complaining
beneficiary.333 The finding of no significant damage made it easier
for the court to ignore the standard duties of trustee, just as in
cases of egregious misconduct the court can easily punish the
fiduciary by applying the stricter standard.334 The holding in
Perry leaves beneficiaries of other trusts vulnerable, however,
because dual fiduciaries will be able to rely on the lower
standard, and the beneficiaries have lost the presumptions of bad
faith in any case of trust self-dealing.335
In Copley v. Copley, the court found no violations of fiduciary
duty by the trustees, but the holding was based on an exception
to the trustee standard of no self-dealing rather than an

330. Id. at 100–01. In contrast, the grandson borrowed funds from the company and
was charged 4% annual interest. Id. at 101.
331. See id. at 103 (“But there is no basis for concluding that there was more than an
unintentional disregard of the legal requirements or of the necessity, even in a family
corporation, for formal action to record the proper basis, if it existed, including equitable
offsets, of action taken in respect of corporate funds and rights.”).
332. Id.
333. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
stricter no inquiry rule, a trustee is liable for any self-dealing, whether fair or not).
Another influencing factor may have been the possible characterization of the
complaining beneficiary as a disgruntled former employee: he had worked at one of his
uncle’s separate business but had been fired “after twice using a company automobile for
personal use contrary to orders and proving unsatisfactory in the lumber shed.” Perry,
160 N.E.2d at 102.
334. Perry, 160 N.E.2d at 103; see Rosencrans v. Fry, 91 A.2d 162, 167–68 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952), aff’d 95 A.2d 905 (N.J. 1953) (holding that when voting stock,
“fiduciaries are under a duty to vote in such a way as to promote the interests of the
beneficiaries,” but noting that adjustments to the general rule should be made when such
a vote would be at the expense of the corporation or other shareholders).
335. Perry, 160 N.E.2d at 103.
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application of the less stringent corporate standard.336 There, the
surviving spouse was trustee of two trusts, a marital trust for her
sole benefit and a nonmarital trust for the benefit of the trustor’s
three children as well as the surviving spouse, who was not the
mother of the decedent’s children.337 The trusts were funded
primarily with stock in the decedent’s closely held business.338
The children alleged that the spouse breached her fiduciary duty
by redeeming stock in the company held by the nonmarital trust
at a price that was below the stock’s actual value.339 The
redemption was necessary to raise cash to pay the estate tax
liability.340 After her husband’s death, the surviving spouse took
over management of the company as chair of the board of
directors and as chief executive officer, so she was serving both
the corporate and trustee roles, but her actions in redeeming
the stock were clearly within her trustee duties and the court
341
judged them under trustee standards. However, the court
focused on the decedent’s intent, and the fact that the trust
allowed the redemption, that such redemption was
contemplated by the decedent, and that he had created the
conflict of interest by putting his spouse in position as trustee
of the nonmarital trust and beneficiary of the marital trust.342
Based on those facts, the court concluded that the decedent
had authorized self-dealing, and therefore could not be held to
the common law prohibition against self-dealing.343 The court
nevertheless held that the redeemed shares were undervalued,
and upheld an award adjusting the percentage of shares held
by the marital and nonmarital trusts.344 However, the breach
was essentially treated as a breach of the duty of care,
requiring a corrective remedy but without the necessary
punitive measures when there is a breach of loyalty.345 What is
notable about the opinion is the trial court’s recognition of the
336. See Copley v. Copley, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that
the prohibition of self-dealing “must give way to directions contained in the trust
instrument”).
337. Id. at 848–50.
338. Id. at 849–50.
339. Id. at 847–48.
340. Id. at 853.
341. Id. at 864, 866.
342. Id. at 853, 857.
343. Id. at 862.
344. Id. at 864.
345. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 1051–52, 1059–60 (discussing how
sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duties can range from corrective to punitive). For
example, the court reversed the trial court orders denying fees and costs to the trustees
and removing the trustees. Copley, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 866–73.
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trustor’s choices of trustee as an implicit waiver of the selfdealing prohibition, even while finding that the trustees had
made an error.
In Johnson v. Witkowski, the court begins its opinion with a
telling paragraph: “The situation presented by this case brings to
mind the scenes in old movies in which a ship is sinking and
someone is heard to yell, ‘Man the lifeboats, women and children
first!’ In those movies, the captain usually went down with the
ship.”346
The case involves complex facts and fiduciaries who were
clearly abusing their position. The two defendants in this case
were trustees of trusts holding a majority interest in a closely
held corporation, Johnson Corrugated, and were also officers,
347
directors, and minority shareholders of the corporation. The
defendants started a business that was to supply materials to
Johnson Corrugated’s competitors.348 Financing for the venture
349
was secured with personal guaranties from the defendants. The
defendants apparently became concerned about conflicts with
Johnson Corrugated and brought the company in as a 25%
350
shareholder in the new venture. When the new company ran
into financial trouble and needed additional financing, the new
financial arrangements required an unlimited guaranty from
351
Johnson Corrugated. Things did not improve, so the defendants
removed the trust beneficiary’s brother from the board of
directors of Johnson Corrugated and arranged a sale of assets of
the sinking new company to a newly formed subsidiary of
Johnson Corrugated.352 The new subsidiary would assume all
secured liabilities of the failing venture.353 The sale was financed
by a bank that required Johnson Corrugated to give an unlimited
guaranty, but this time the defendants did not give personal
guaranties.354 The defendants thus were released from significant
355
liability under the original personal guaranties.
The Johnson court had interesting observations about the
problem of multiple fiduciary roles. “Wearing more than one

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Johnson v. Witkowski, 573 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id. at 516–17.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 516–18.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 517–18.
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hat—here, at least three—requires a fiduciary to be very nimble
as well as most prudent. While the fiduciary may purport to wear
one hat at a particular moment, in truth, all hats are worn
together at all times.”356 In judging the defendants’ actions, the
court appeared to find a breach of both their corporate and
trustee fiduciary duties.357 In responding to a claim of protection
under the business judgment rule, the court, rather than
rejecting it as inapplicable where duties of a trustee are owed,
held that it was inapplicable in the corporate setting where, as
358
here, the directors are personally interested in the transaction.
The court also notably found that the trust provisions providing
wide discretion to manage the trust and the corporation, and the
fact that the trustor “obviously contemplates the conflicts present in
the identity of the directors, officers, trustees, and shareholders,”
were not sufficient to constitute a waiver of self-dealing.359
The influential Delaware court addressed the dual-acting
fiduciary in Stegemeier v. Magness.360 The decedent’s estate
consisted of undeveloped real property and 83% of a construction
company that was in financial difficulty.361 The Will provided for
a gift in trust to the surviving spouse and a residuary trust for
the benefit of the surviving widow for life, remainder to his
children (three of whom were not the children of the widow).362
The widow was also named as co-executor of the estate, together
with a lawyer, and the decedent’s brother, who owned the
remaining 17% of the construction company, was named as
trustee of the trusts.363 The estate attempted to sell the real
estate or obtain financing for the construction company to
develop the real estate but was unsuccessful at both.364 In order
to get financing to develop the real estate, the widow and the
365
trustee individually formed a new, debt-free corporation. The
estate (through the co-executors, the widow and the lawyer) sold
the land to the new corporation, securing the purchase price with

356. Id. at 518.
357. Id. at 521.
358. Id. at 522.
359. Id. at 522–23; see supra note 327 (discussing Professor Melanie Leslie’s
observation that trustee exculpatory clauses are only enforced by courts in certain
categories of cases).
360. Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557, 557 (Del. 1999).
361. Id. at 559–60.
362. Id. at 559.
363. Id. at 559–60.
364. Id. at 560.
365. Id.
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a mortgage, and so the land was never placed into the trust.366
The new corporation developed and sold the property.367 Two of the
stepdaughters who were remainder beneficiaries sued, claiming
that the sale of the land to the new corporation was a breach of the
fiduciary duties of the co-executors and of the trustee.368 The lower
court held in favor of the defendant fiduciaries, finding that the
remaindermen did not have standing because any profits from the
development and sale of the land would have been trust income and
the widow was the sole income beneficiary.369 Furthermore, the
lower court held that the fiduciaries did not engage in self-dealing,
using its interpretation of the corporate, rather than trustee,
standard of self-dealing.370 The lower court had dismissed the claim
of self-dealing against the lawyer co-executor, since he had no other
interest in the transactions, and found that in order for the actions
of the brother trustee and the widow to be considered self-dealing,
the relevant factor was not whether they had a personal interest in
the transaction but whether either of them could have alone caused
the sale, without consent from anyone else.371 This is a broad
reading of the corporate standard, which allows self-dealing of a
director if a majority of disinterested directors approve the
transaction.372 In this case, it was enough for the trial court that
there was necessary participation by just one uninterested person,
the lawyer co-executor.373
The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court
374
and held that the trust standard should apply. The only reason
given by the court for this selection is that the decedent chose the
375
form of a trust to hold his assets. The court further declined to
extend the corporate self-dealing standard to the trust context,
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 559–61.
369. Id. at 560–61.
370. Id. at 561–62.
371. Id. at 560–62.
372. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011). Section 144 also allows an interested
transaction if the terms are fair to the corporation, even if a majority of disinterested
directors had not approved. Id.; see supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (discussing
the corporate standard).
373. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 562.
374. Id. at 562–63.
375. Id. at 563. Interestingly, the court did not consider the inherent conflicts of
interest created by the decedent’s choices in his estate plan, a factor considered critical by
other courts. See Copley v. Copley, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (noting
that there is an inherent conflict in the trustor’s appointment of a single individual to
serve as both administratrix and co-trustee); Bartlett v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 13 (N.H.
1986) (finding that an inherent conflict of interest existed in the appointment of an
employee to both trust and corporate fiduciary positions).
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despite the various exceptions that have been created under the
trust standard, because the underlying purpose of the absolute
prohibition—to prevent fraud that would otherwise be difficult to
detect,376 and to relieve “trustees from any possible conflict
between duty and self interest,”377—would not be served by such a
relaxation of the standard.378 Under trust law principles, it was
clear that the fiduciaries’ actions constituted self-dealing, and the
corporate safe harbor of establishing fairness of the transaction
was no longer available to them.379 The fiduciaries argued
necessity as a justification for the sale because of the difficulty in
obtaining financing to develop and sell the property.380 Although
that may be true, the court held that the fiduciaries still had to
381
obtain advance approval of the beneficiaries or of a court.
Although the court was harsh in its application of the
standard, the remedy was closer to the result under the corporate
standard. Because the lots had already been sold to third parties,
the court agreed that the beneficiaries were entitled to the profits
382
received by the fiduciaries as a result of the sale. However, the
court held that because the new corporation had made significant
improvements to the property before selling it, including building
houses on the lots, the profit on sale of the property was due to
the new corporation’s efforts.383 Therefore, the trust was entitled
only to the difference between the fair market value of the land
384
and the price paid by the new corporation. The case was
remanded because the trial court placed the burden of proving
376. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 562–65; see supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text
(noting that due to the lack of supervision and monitoring of trustees, fraud might be
difficult to detect).
377. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 564 (quoting Downs v. Rickards, 4 Del. Ch. 416, 430
(Del. Ch. 1872)).
378. See Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 565 (noting that the principles behind trust law
serve more than just fairness—the minimal requirement of the relaxed standard).
379. Id. at 562–63. The trial court had made a finding that the price paid for the land
was fair, and thus would have protected them under the corporate standard set forth in
the Delaware statute. Id. at 561–62; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011). However, the
burden of proving the adequacy of the purchase price was put on the beneficiaries by the
trial court, whereas the burden under the state statute would be on the interested
director. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 566, 568; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011); see Keenan
v. Eshleman, 234 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. 1938) (finding that the interested party has the
burden of proving fairness where an interested transaction occurs involving multiple
corporate duties).
380. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 565.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 565–66. This is consistent with the general rule. See 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER
& ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2, at 1077–79 (noting that breach results in voiding the
transaction, or awards costs and profits to the plaintiff).
383. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 565–66.
384. Id. at 566.

Do Not Delete

2012]

4/29/2012 5:25 PM

TOO MANY TIARAS

285

the inadequacy of the purchase price on the beneficiaries after it
found no self-dealing, and the beneficiaries were therefore left with
a duty of care allegation (i.e, charging that the price paid to the
trust was insufficient).385 Since the supreme court found there was
self-dealing, the fiduciaries had to prove no damage by proving the
fairness of the price.386 Therefore, the fiduciaries were able to defend
the transaction on remand on the basis of fairness of purchase
price,387 which normally is a defense only in the corporate context.388
Thus, even though the court held the fiduciaries liable under the
legal rules, its application of the appropriate remedy switched to the
more lenient corporate standard. The court should have analyzed it
as a misappropriation of a trust opportunity and required the
389
fiduciaries to disgorge all profits, less any out of pocket expenses.
The cases generally illustrate the courts’ confusion as to
which standard to apply, and their apparent resolution of the
issue by first determining the extent of the harm complained of.
The opinions do give some precedent for considering the design of
the plan, and the choice of putting one person in the two roles, as
an indication of the trustor’s intent to waive certain fiduciary
duties. However, a dual-role fiduciary reading these decisions
would receive little if any guidance as to the extent of the
fiduciary duties applicable to his or her situation.
IV. A NEW STANDARD FOR THE DUAL-ROLE FIDUCIARY
While Bruce Winston may have had good grounds to object to
his brother’s administration of his trust and the company, the
harder question is the one faced by the person who finds himself in
385. Id. at 566–67.
386. Id.
387. Id. The defendants successfully carried the burden of proving a fair purchase
price on remand and were therefore not liable to the beneficiaries. Stegemeier v. Magness,
No. Civ. A. 12845, 1999 WL 1083874, at *7, (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 1999), aff’d 748 A.2d 408
(Del. 2000).
388. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2011) (finding interested transactions not
automatically voidable where they are fair at the time the transaction takes place); 3
SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2.1.1, at 1089–91 (“In both England and
the United States a trustee ordinarily violates the duty of loyalty by purchasing trust
property in his or her individual capacity without the beneficiaries’ consent, even if the
transaction is in all other respects unobjectionable. . . . Of course, if the trustee has
already paid a fair price, the beneficiaries may affirm the sale, as they may well wish to
do if the value of the property has fallen, for the sale is not void but voidable. In other
words, when a trustee purchases trust property without the beneficiaries’ consent, the
trustee cannot profit from an increase in the value of the property but must bear the loss
on a decline.”).
389. See 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 25, § 17.2, at 1078–79 (reasoning
that trustees who place their own interests over those of the trust are generally liable for
loss and for any profits).
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this dual role, or the question faced by the trustor and business
owner trying to devise a workable plan. Should the trustee–
business manager conduct the business in a manner that takes the
trust beneficiary’s specific financial needs into account? For
example, if the beneficiary is elderly and the trust is the
beneficiary’s primary source of income, that would seem to dictate
that the trustee–business manager avoid risks, such as expansion
or development of new product lines that put a current strain on the
business’s finances and are not likely to pay off in the beneficiary’s
lifetime. Such an approach would certainly affect the long-term
success of the business, however. This conflict is similar to the
trustee’s conflict between serving an income beneficiary and a
remainder beneficiary, and trust law has responded by imposing a
duty of impartiality.390
The duty of impartiality requires that a trustee straddle the
391
interests of the two, and not favor one over the other. Applied to
this scenario, the trustee–business manager would have to consider
both the interests of the business and the interests of the
beneficiary. Extension of the duty of impartiality to this scenario,
where the trustee is allowed to include the interests of the business
as an interest to be accommodated, would be a useful solution to the
trustee–business manager’s dilemma. Application of this principle
would depend on the circumstances, as does the duty of
impartiality. For example, the beneficiary may not be very
dependent on the trust income, and may be young and therefore
interested in long-term business growth. That fact pattern would
put the emphasis on the business’s interests over the beneficiary’s.
Also, the extent of the beneficiary’s interest compared to other
owners in the enterprise should also be considered. Other owners
are in essence third-party beneficiaries of the health of the business
enterprise. If the impartiality model is extended in this manner, it
could also be adjusted by the terms of the trust agreement, as
trustors can adjust the duty of impartiality among beneficiaries.392
The impartiality approach is rather modest, however, and may not

390. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1959) (explaining that a
trustee who has a duty to an income beneficiary and some other successive beneficiary
must both work to create income from the property and avoid unproductive investments,
while also avoiding investments that will cause the property to depreciate in value); UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 803, 7C U.L.A. 362 (2006) (noting the rule of impartiality).
391. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 cmt. b (describing the dual duties
of a fiduciary who has to manage a trust to benefit both an income beneficiary and a
remainder beneficiary).
392. For example, a trustor may specify in the trust instrument that the trustee is to
consider the lifetime support of the income beneficiary as paramount, even if serving that
interest jeopardizes the remaindermen’s interest.
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be sufficient to give the trustee–business manager enough flexibility
to run the business successfully. Additional adjustment to the dual
fiduciary’s duty is necessary.
The duty of care owed may be the easiest issue to tackle. The
risk-taking necessary to run a business and the ability to be free
from a requirement of diversifying risk both face constraints from
the trustee’s duty of care.393 A trustor has significant power to
reduce the trustee’s duty of care, as long as the trustee still acts
394
with good faith. This power of the trustor, together with the
implication that the trustor intended to reduce the duty of care by
the creation of the dual role, should be enough to create a
presumption that the dual-role fiduciary’s duty of care should be the
lesser corporate duty. That presumption could be rebutted by
statements of contrary intent by the trustor. This approach would
directly recognize implied waivers of trustee duties by the trustor’s
selection of fiduciaries. While some courts have gone this far,395
courts often require an express waiver of duties by the trustor.396
This is a criticism raised by Professor Langbein in his argument
that the contractarian view of trusts should be recognized.397 In
addressing the imbedded conflicts with respect to the duty of
loyalty, he gives as an example:
Low-grade conflicts of interest are especially endemic in
family trusteeships. We see constantly in real-world practice
some version of the case in which my father names me trustee
for my mother for life, remainder to a group including me,
with a power in the trustee to invade the corpus of the trust
for the benefit of my mother in the event the life interest
becomes inadequate for her comfort and support. My father
has insisted on choosing a conflict-tainted trustee, making the
judgment that I am to be trusted not to pauperize my
mother to enrich myself. These situations are especially
dangerous when the trust is given a controlling interest
in a close corporation, and I am an officer of that firm. If

393. See supra notes 47–65 and accompanying text (describing a trustee’s duty to
minimize risks).
394. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 cmt. d (2007); 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER
& ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 25, § 17.6, at 1209–10.
395. See, e.g., Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d 585, 594–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(interpreting a trust instrument as allowing a trustee to use his own “special investment
philosophy”).
396. See Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 932–35 (Sur. Ct. 1975); Richard V.
Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries—Is Rothko Right?, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 95, 113–14 (1978) (arguing that by selecting trustees whom he knew would have
conflicts of interest, Mark Rothko intentionally authorized those trustees to serve their
own personal interests as well as the estate’s).
397. Langbein, supra note 24, at 667.
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he is well counseled, my father spells out broad authority
for me as trustee, expressly trumping the default
standards of the duty of loyalty. But when he neglects
that step, contractarian analysis encourages us to look at
the real nature of the trust deal, that is, what he and I
understood, or what we would have understood about the
purposes of the trust and the standard for my
trusteeship. The standard is not the same as when my
father places a portfolio of fungible financial assets in
398
trust with Wells Fargo or Northern Trust.

Using the presumption of implied waiver to go as low as the
applicable business entity standard, complete with the business
judgment rule, may not give sufficient consideration to the
beneficiary’s inability to exit the arrangement or any particular
vulnerabilities of the beneficiary. Recognition of the beneficiary’s
situation may factor into the type of facts that could rebut the
presumption of waiver, but some accommodation of the
beneficiary’s interest may also require an upward adjustment of
the duty of care, depending on the business entity form and the
applicable duty.
The duty of loyalty for the dual-role fiduciary is more
troublesome. The Stegemeier case illustrated a direct conflict
between the two roles where the fiduciary looks to transact
business with the entity. The waiver of such a conflict implied by
the trustor’s choice of fiduciary should lessen the burden, but
dropping the fiduciary’s duty down to the business entity
standard disregards the beneficiary’s status in a more sensitive
context and without the countervailing considerations of the need
for freedom to take risks in running the enterprise. The strict
trustee duty, on the other hand, is too limiting in the context
where the trustee is likely to have his or her own investment in
the enterprise. Here, the duty of loyalty should be somewhere
between the two. Professor Langbein proposed a new formulation
of the trustee’s duty of loyalty, that of acting in the beneficiary’s
best interest, rather than sole interest.399 Under Professor
Langbein’s formulation, the fiduciary may serve his or her own
400
interests, as long as those do not conflict with the beneficiaries.
His mechanism for doing so would be to convert the irrebuttable
presumption of wrongdoing for self-dealing into a rebuttable one,
allowing the trustee to defend an action of self-dealing on the

398.
399.
400.

Id.
Langbein, supra note 175, at 980–82.
Id.

Do Not Delete

2012]

4/29/2012 5:25 PM

TOO MANY TIARAS

289

grounds that the beneficiaries’ interests were not harmed.401 His
arguments for this dramatic adjustment in the centuries-old rule
includes numerous examples where the trustee actions
prohibited under the sole interest rule would in fact be beneficial
to the beneficiaries.402 The dual fiduciary is a prominent example
of potential harm to the beneficiaries because of the limitations
on the trustee intended to protect the beneficiary. This approach
has already appeared in the Uniform Trust Code, in
circumstances where the transaction is between the trust and an
affiliate of the trustee such as a spouse or controlled
corporation.403 The best interest rule should be extended to
circumstances where the fiduciary would be able to enter into the
transaction under the rules of one role, that of business fiduciary,
but not another, that of trustee.
In summary, a new hybrid set of rules should be developed
to guide the dual fiduciary and to evaluate such a fiduciary’s
actions. First, it should be explicitly recognized that the position
of fiduciary to the business entity requires that the fiduciary
balance the best interests of the entity with the best interests of
the trust beneficiaries. In the Winston scenario, Ronald would be
able to make decisions based on the well-being of the business as
long as those decisions were not overly harmful to the interests of
Bruce, the trust beneficiary. On the other hand, he would not be
required to serve Bruce’s best interests if those were detrimental
to the business. This balancing was recognized in the Rosencrans
decision, which specifically recognized the interests of the
corporation and the other shareholders as necessary factors in
404
The inclusion of the
the dual fiduciary’s decisionmaking.
interests of the business entity and its other owners as part of
the decisionmaking considerations does not adequately address
the specific dilemmas of the dual fiduciary, however. In addition,
it is necessary to acknowledge that the appointment of a dual
fiduciary is in fact an implied waiver of strict duties of care and
loyalty. With respect to duty of care, this implied waiver should
allow for application of a modified business judgment rule, that
requires consideration of the beneficiary’s more captive position
than that of other business owners. For duty of loyalty, Professor
Langbein’s proposal that the fiduciary can rebut allegations of
breach of duty of loyalty with evidence that the beneficiaries’
interests were not harmed should be introduced in the context of
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. at 980–81.
Id. at 954–57.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 588–89 (2006).
Rosencrans v. Fry, 91 A.2d 162, 165–66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952).
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dual fiduciaries.405 This approach would allow the fiduciary to
benefit personally as one of the business owners as well as to
consider the business entity’s well-being and the interests of the
other business owners. The formalization of this hybrid standard
for dual fiduciaries would assist courts that heretofore have
either drifted to one or the other set of standards depending on
the culpability of the fiduciary or created ad hoc considerations to
lessen the more strict duties of trustee while still trying to
maintain special protections for beneficiaries.
V. CONCLUSION
The lot of a fiduciary is difficult enough because of the
uncertainties of the extent of her duties and her exposure to
liability to the beneficiaries. When the fiduciary serves in two
different kinds of fiduciary roles with respect to the same
property, knowing how to stay out of trouble becomes impossible.
This is particularly true when the two roles are trustee and
business entity fiduciary, at the two ends of the fiduciary duty
spectrum. Courts have judged such fiduciaries with a variety of
standards, based in part on the circumstances and sometimes on
an assumption that using the stricter duty is the most reasonable
choice.406 In the absence of clear direction from the trustor who
put the fiduciary in such an ambiguous situation, courts should
acknowledge the need for risktaking in business management
and use the lower standard for duty of care. Courts should adjust
the duty of loyalty and accommodate the imbedded conflicts with
the fiduciary’s personal interests by using a standard of best
interests of the beneficiary, rather than sole interest, as the
limits of the duty of loyalty in this circumstance. The duty of
impartiality owed by trustees should further be adjusted to allow
consideration of the needs of the business in addition to the
diverse needs of the beneficiaries. Although certainty is never
possible for the fiduciary, codification of these standards for the
dual-role fiduciary, similar to the codification of trustee duties
now existing under the Uniform Trust Code, would give the dualrole fiduciary the most peace of mind when carrying out his
duties.

405.
406.

See Langbein, supra note 175, at 980–81.
See supra Part III.B. (describing cases with multiple fiduciaries).

